Bedford Motion to allow Congress to have the power to legislate for the common interest
I do have a vague recollection that Rakove characterized the resolution that Congress would have the power to legislate for the common interest as a “placeholder,” that would suffice until the question of representation in both houses of the national legislature was decided. Only then, after it became clear who would be wielding the powers invested in the national government, would the delegates be comfortable deciding what powers could be safely given to the national government. I wonder whether the small states would have gone along with providing Congress with the quite broad power to legislate for the common interest if both houses were based on proportional representation. They well may have walked out.
Regards,
Steve Gutstein [Esq. NYC]
Calvin Johnson responds:
No, the Bedford Motion, that Congress would have the power to legislate for the common interest is late, and it is opposed by all the people who ever spoke in favor of an enumeration, and they lose. Most (but not Sherman or South Carolina) turn around and vote for the whole Resolution once the Bedford motion is attached. It is a real vote on the merits, with the voters expecting that outcome because it is a binding Resolution on the drafting committees.
Madison, who makes the place holder argument, is a representative of Virginia , and he is offended by Delaware and evil Rhode Island, getting 2/13 of the vote for something like 2% of the population. But he is bluffing about restricting federal power. He is at that point too much of a dedicated nationalist. Even after the end of the Convention (when the accursed equal vote per state is put into the Senate) he is upset that Congress has too little power, not too much. He still wants his veto over the states “in every case whatsoever” even after Delaware and RI are so overrepresented. I have a long section in Righteous Anger looking at the question of whether Madison became Jeffersonian to restrict the national government early and concluded, most certainly no.
Delaware does tell the Convention it will have to leave if it does not get equal vote power per state. But Bedford motion calling for power to legislate in all cases for the common interest of the union is written by Gunning Bedford of Delaware. Delaware becomes a big power to the federal state and ratifies unanimously.
Regards,
Steve Gutstein [Esq. NYC]
Calvin Johnson responds:
No, the Bedford Motion, that Congress would have the power to legislate for the common interest is late, and it is opposed by all the people who ever spoke in favor of an enumeration, and they lose. Most (but not Sherman or South Carolina) turn around and vote for the whole Resolution once the Bedford motion is attached. It is a real vote on the merits, with the voters expecting that outcome because it is a binding Resolution on the drafting committees.
Madison, who makes the place holder argument, is a representative of Virginia , and he is offended by Delaware and evil Rhode Island, getting 2/13 of the vote for something like 2% of the population. But he is bluffing about restricting federal power. He is at that point too much of a dedicated nationalist. Even after the end of the Convention (when the accursed equal vote per state is put into the Senate) he is upset that Congress has too little power, not too much. He still wants his veto over the states “in every case whatsoever” even after Delaware and RI are so overrepresented. I have a long section in Righteous Anger looking at the question of whether Madison became Jeffersonian to restrict the national government early and concluded, most certainly no.
Delaware does tell the Convention it will have to leave if it does not get equal vote power per state. But Bedford motion calling for power to legislate in all cases for the common interest of the union is written by Gunning Bedford of Delaware. Delaware becomes a big power to the federal state and ratifies unanimously.
<< Home