

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

Aug. 16

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials	Date
1.	Elliott Abrams		
2.	Gary Matthews		
3.	Charles Fairbanks		
4.	George Lister		
5.			

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
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Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

Gabriel Valdes Smear Campaign.

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FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
G. Lister	
	Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
 Prescribed by GSA
 FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

August 16, 1983

To: Elliott Abrams

Subject: Gabriel Valdes Smear Campaign

The attached letter from Martin Poblete provides some details on the GOC smear campaign against Gabriel Valdes. You will recall that Martin is a Chilean Christian Democrat activist currently teaching in NYC. He has been in your office at least once.

George Lister

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cc: Bob Snyder

New York, August 2nd, 1983.

Mr. George Lister
Room 7802
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Lister:

The enclosures will give you a pale idea of the smear campaign of the Pinochet government against Gabriel Valdes. It seems to me that they are trying to create a climate similar to the one that preceded the assassinations of General Carlos Prats, former Ambassador Orlando Letelier, and labor leader Tucapel Jimenez. Therefore, it is important that our friends are informed of this dangerous development that threatens the life of the man who has emerged as the undisputed leader of the democratic opposition in Chile.

Best regards, un abrazo,



Martin Poblete

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date Aug. 16

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. ESTABL Strom		
2. Gary Matthews <i>[Signature]</i>		
3. Charles Fairbanks <i>CAF</i>		
4. George Lister		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
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Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

WOLA: USG Chile Policy

GL - Show, try COMA!
SA

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FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post) G. Lister	Room No.—Bldg.
	Phone No.

5041-102

GPO : 1962 O - 305-021 (221)

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.606

August 16, 1953

To: Elliott Abrams

Subject: WOLA: USG Chile Policy

As you know, I pushed WOLA hard for at least a cheer and a half for our July 11 statement in favor of a transition to democracy in Chile. I think that's about what we got in the attached WOLA update.

George Lister

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cc: Bob Snyder



UPDATE

July/August 1983

Vol. VIII, No. 4

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LATIN AMERICA

Chileans Demand Democracy Now

The first massive demonstrations in nearly a decade have forced President General Augusto Pinochet to supplement massive intimidation and select repression with some concessions. Faced with an inflation rate of approximately 30%, unemployment and underemployment of close to the same, and a dramatic 14% drop in GNP in 1982, thousands of Chileans protested peacefully on May 11, June 14 and July 12.

The May 11 national day of protest was called by Rodolfo Seguel, President of the Copper Workers Federation (CTC) and the National Workers Coalition (CNT) and was concentrated mainly in Santiago. Police rounded up 10,000 people, arrested 350 people, restricted the media, and banished eight labor leaders to isolated parts of the country. Concurrently, Pinochet offered some economic modifications. He removed a two-week old 30% price increase on kerosene and cooking oil. He also gave a 5% pay raise to government employees and nitrate miners.

The May 11 protest paved the way for others. As one Santiago daily reported, "a new era has begun, encouraged by the high level of public discontent and the government's loss of support that is acknowledged by practically everyone."

Support for the second national day of protest on June 14 blossomed throughout the nation. The demands voiced on May 11 for economic and labor law reforms were expanded to demands for the democratization of Chile. On June 19, the pro-government daily *El Mercurio* reported "Even those closest to the regime began to distance themselves and become the regime's most influential critics."

Again Pinochet attempted to quell dissent with force. On June 14, police arrested 1,351 persons, nearly half in Santiago alone. The arrest of Rodolfo Seguel and the dismissal of 25 workers in the El Salvador copper mine provoked a strike, there and at the El Teniente and Andina copper mines. Pinochet ordered thousands of workers fired and banned the media from mentioning the general strike, demonstrations or protests. The state-owned copper company, CODELCO, fired 31 union leaders and dismissed 799 copper workers. By June 27, fifteen union leaders were imprisoned. In the next week, 50 armed CNI (Chilean

secret police) agents raided the offices of the National Workers Union (CNS) and arrested five CNS directors.

With the unions impaired, the *Multipartidaria* called for the third strike and political leaders moved into the limelight. Major opposition party leaders, including Gabriel Valdes (President of the Christian Democratic Party) and Jorge Lavandero (President of the *Multipartidaria* and PRODEN), were detained. This hard-line response was accompanied by a few gestures of "abertura." Government officials agreed to finance the renegotiation of US\$130 million in debts held by members of the truckers' union, resolving that group's most urgent demand; Pinochet announced an end to the censorship of books, and new lists of exiles who would be allowed to return to Chile included several prominent opposition politicians. Copper union leaders who met with government officials to request reinstatement of the fired workers were told a response would be given after July 12.

On July 12, the third national day of protest, anti-government demonstrations abounded, in spite of harsh censorship, a curfew between 8 p.m. and midnight, the deployment of military forces, and the effective neutralization of opposition labor leaders and politicians. As of this writing, 560 arrests were reported in Santiago during the day of protest, and two people were killed. The Pinochet regime responded with the release of five opposition political leaders, including Gabriel Valdes, and U.S. State Department reports indicated that CODELCO had begun to reinstate fired workers.

As the democratic opposition gains ground and visibility in Chile, U.S. support for an immediate transition to democracy becomes more critical.

In his confirmation hearings on June 28 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ambassador Langhorne Motley, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs answered questions by Senator Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN) regarding U.S. policy towards Chile. Asked about popular elections, Motley replied that the democratic process in Chile contemplates elections later—"possibly in the next decade." (The Constitution approved in a plebiscite in 1980 grants executive authority to General Pinochet

(continued on page 2)

Power Play in Guatemala

Confronted with the most serious challenge to the government's legitimacy since coming to power in a military coup in March 1982, Guatemalan President General Efraín Ríos Montt responded to calls for his resignation on June 28 with a series of measures designed to diffuse the conflict by "opening" up the democratic process.

Opposition activities heightened on June 5 when Guatemala's most senior active Army general, Echeverría Vielman, issued an open letter calling for an end to the military's political involvement in governmental activities, for immediate constituent assembly elections, and for the temporary suspension of judicial reforms (i.e., the special military courts).

On June 6, four centrist-to-right political parties pledged support for Echeverría's letter. Three days later Echeverría was retired from the Guatemalan Army and warrants were issued for the arrest of four political leaders who had publicly criticized Ríos Montt.

Further challenges to the government came from the business community when a prominent group of business leaders publicly expressed deep concern over the economic crisis and called for steps toward a

democratic opening. They criticized the proposed new fiscal laws, which would include Guatemala's first value-added tax (part of World Bank conditions for a \$120 million balance of payments credit).

On June 28, Colonel Francisco Gordillo requested Ríos Montt's resignation, accusing him of betraying the principles of the 1982 coup and of creating religious and political antagonisms which were dividing the state. At the same time, Lionel Sienfuegos Otero, a former high official of the right-wing National Liberation Movement, attacked Ríos Montt for his betrayal of the civilian participants in the 1982 coup.

The crisis peaked on June 29 when heavy military maneuvers were carried out in downtown Guatemala City amid rumors of a planned coup d'état. By midday Ríos Montt had once again imposed a nationwide state of exception which broadly curtailed civil liberties and freedom of the press. On the morning of June 29, Ríos Montt successfully mobilized the military in Guatemala City to defend against any coup attempt and later declared a state of alarm.

Ríos Montt was nevertheless forced to make
(continued on page 8)

Chile, continued

until 1989 with possible elections in 1988.) Motley added that Chile is the one country which "came back from a Marxist regime," a friendly country whose redemocratization process we applauded, and that it would be incorrect for the United States to dictate a timetable for elections.

Throughout June and July, however, a number of strong statements emerged which indicated that Motley's view is not necessarily shared by other Administration officials. These statements lacked the usual references to the Chilean Constitution of 1980 and surpassed the "quiet diplomacy" generally employed by the Reagan Administration. At the June 16 State Department press briefing, Administration spokesman John Hughes stated that the detained opposition leader, Rodolfo Seguel, "speaks for an important segment of the people of that country." In another press briefing a week later, Hughes commented that the return of some exiles was "a moderate and positive step" and added the hope that a resolution could be found "through further steps such as this."

The arrest of Gabriel Valdés and other Christian Democratic leaders on July 9 prompted a critical statement by the State Department which publicly announced that their concerns on the arrests had been

communicated to "senior government officials." In that statement, they supported the transition to democracy "as defined by the Chileans themselves."

The State Department response to the July 12 protests admitted that "considerable evidence of popular discontent was manifested" and reiterated their belief that "the current political tensions in Chile can best be resolved through moderation and dialogue regarding national issues, such as the transition to democracy."

An additional statement by spokesman John Hughes on July 14 declared that the decision of the court to release Valdés "is an indication that peaceful dissent is protected by Chilean law." This statement is a bit premature in its portrayal of an independent judiciary in Chile. The Chilean government has appealed the decision and the courts will review the appeal in late July.

The role the United States will play in promoting the transition to democracy is in the process of being defined. Some of the recent statements give cause for hope. Statements such as Motley's and continued U.S. backing for loans to Chile, however, suggest that the United States may continue to back a modified strategy of repression and cooptation rather than the immediate redemocratization called for by the Chilean people. ■

Congress Postpones Foreign Aid Debate

After a flurry of congressional activity on foreign affairs in late Spring (see *Update*, May/June 1983), only a handful of foreign affairs issues will come to the floor before the August recess. The prohibition of covert aid against Nicaragua is scheduled for debate before the House on July 19 and 20 (see article, page 5). The trade portion of the 1982 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), allowing most Caribbean products to be imported duty-free, was approved recently by both the House and the Senate. The CBI will go to a House-Senate Conference Committee before the President signs it, probably by late August.

Two appropriations bills which include military and economic aid for Latin America must be approved before the beginning of the new fiscal year (FY84) on October 1. In June, both chambers of Congress approved the FY83 Supplemental Appropriations Bill which now awaits consideration by a House-Senate Conference Committee. Disagreements in Congress over the level of military aid appropriated to El Salvador remain unresolved. The House deleted the President's \$50 million request for additional military aid, while the Senate approved the entire request. In

addition, the House bill prohibits any security assistance (military aid or economic support funds) to Guatemala. The Senate bill contains no such prohibition.

This summer, congressional committees may also debate foreign aid appropriations for FY84 and a proposal by Senators Jackson (D-WA) and Mathias (R-MD) and Representatives Barnes (D-MD) and Kemp (R-NY) for the President to appoint a bipartisan commission to study the problems of poverty, democratic development and human rights in Central America. This commission, to be headed by Dr. Henry Kissinger, would make recommendations for U.S. military and economic aid and counsel on trade, political and social policies.

Other congressional action may focus on the U.S. Agency for International Development's request for \$80 million in emergency assistance to help Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia recover from floods and droughts. The \$80 million emergency request is currently being stalled by the Office of Management and Budget of the White House. ■

Actions on these and other issues will be reported on in the next issue of UPDATE.

Foreign Aid Legislation Cycle

The following outlines the general steps in the foreign aid program development on a fiscal year (FY) basis (FY— from October 1-September 30). The process covers both authorizations (which set policy guidelines and expenditure ceilings) and appropriations (which allocate money from the U.S. Treasury).

CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION (CPD)—In February or March, after 7-10 months of preparation by the administration, the State Department presents the CPD to Congress. The CPD outlines proposed foreign assistance funding levels and programs for the upcoming fiscal year.

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS—The appropriate committees and subcommittees hear testimony from government officials, experts, and interested parties on the issues relevant to the administration's requests and their foreign policy.

LEGISLATIVE MARKUP—The appropriate subcommittees then meet to review, section-by-section, the legislation which incorporates their findings and the administration's requests into one package. Subcommittees markup first. Their work is then reviewed/debated by the full committee.

FLOOR PASSAGE—The "marked up" version of the bill goes to the House/Senate floor for amendments and approval.

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE—Selected members of the House and Senate meet to work out the differences in each chamber's version of the bill.

PUBLIC LAW—The final conference committee version of the bill is approved by both chambers of Congress and sent to the president for his signature.

Military Make and Execute Policies in Honduras

The U.S. training of Salvadoran troops on Honduran soil demonstrates a lack of interest in strengthening that country's incipient democracy. While the Reagan Administration voices its support for peace and democracy in Central America, U.S. policy towards Honduras has not only violated the Honduran Constitution but has reinforced the military as the most powerful institution in that country.

In late May, the military demonstrated its authority when the Chief of the Armed Forces of Honduras, General Gustavo Alvarez, approved an agreement with the Pentagon to set up a "Honduran" base to train Salvadoran troops in his country. The President of the Honduran Congress accused the military of violating the Constitution by allowing foreign forces to enter the country without congressional approval. Soon thereafter, Gen. Alvarez convinced the Congress to approve the Honduran "Regional Center for Military and Security Training" (CREMS). A semantic compromise was reached whereby the program would train "students," not soldiers, and there would be no "offensive weapons" in the CREMS. At the end of June, however, hundreds of Salvadoran "students," who had been fighting leftist guerrillas in their country, arrived for anti-guerrilla training in Puerto Castilla, Honduras.

Clearly, the Armed Forces are playing a key role in making and executing decisions in Honduras. The military's desire for more weapons, and the political power accompanying more arms, derogates the civilian government and its present policies and threatens peace and democracy.

The growing strength of the Honduran Armed Forces is apparent in contradictory statements between the military and the civilians on foreign policy issues. For example, Honduran Foreign Minister Edgardo Paz Barnica insisted that his country's foreign policy is based on neutrality and peace, yet Gen. Alvarez said, "We cannot remain neutral," and prepares for war. Paz Barnica denied any knowledge of and/or support for the *contras* operating out of Honduras to overthrow the Nicaraguan government; Gen. Alvarez told Washington that if the U.S. Congress cuts off aid to the *contras*, he would keep supporting the "freedom fighters." Paz Barnica advocated that the Honduran Congress give prior approval to treaties negotiated and signed by the executive; Gen. Alvarez presented the treaty to the Congress as a *fait accompli*, after U.S. green berets

had already arrived in Honduras. And while Paz Barnica continues to insist that Honduras is a democracy that respects human rights, one of Gen. Alvarez' subordinates, Juan Blas Salazar, acknowledged the detention of eighteen political prisoners who "disappeared." At a press conference sponsored by Salazar, six who are being tried declared that they had been tortured and illegally detained in clandestine jails by security and intelligence forces.

The growing strength of the Honduran Armed Forces is apparent in contradictory statements between the military and the civilians on foreign policy issues.

While the contradictions between the Foreign Minister and the Chief of the Armed Forces abound, President Suazo Cordova works hand-in-glove with Gen. Alvarez. "The day my orders are not obeyed, I will just go home," said Suazo Cordova. Gen. Alvarez commented, "The day the President of this republic gives me an order I do not like, I will leave my position." (Time, 6/13/83)

In Washington, Gen. Alvarez stated that "the Sandinistas are our enemy." He added that Honduras desires more military aid and equipment and, if needed, a U.S. commitment of troops. His increased bellicosity has been encouraged by the United States. The U.S. retiring Army Chief of Staff E.C. Meyer feels that the United States should build in Honduras military airstrips supplied with planes, helicopters, anti-aircraft weapons and radar-warning systems (Washington Post, 6/30/83). "My own views always have been that we have to build on whatever strength we had in the region, and I believe Honduras is a strength," Meyer stated. "I'd really try to anchor the defense of the region initially on Honduras."

Aside from exacerbating internal tensions, drawing Honduras further into the El Salvador conflict is counterproductive to U.S. interests. By insisting on the militarization of Honduras and that country's role as a source of military stability, the Reagan Administration is destroying in Honduras what it says it wants to build, through elections, in El Salvador. ■

Covert Action Vote Approaches

After three postponements, the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) discussed the Boland-Zablocki Bill (HR 2760) on June 6 and 7. The bill prohibits U.S. support for covert operations in Nicaragua. It also authorizes payments of \$30 million in FY83 and \$50 million in FY84 for friendly Central American governments to interdict the supply of arms from Cuba and Nicaragua to any group planning the overthrow of any government in the region.

On June 7, the HFAC approved the bill by a near party-line vote of 20-14. Representatives Fascal (D-FL) and Ireland (D-FL) voted against the bill. These Democrats and others are endeavoring to modify the bill to make it acceptable to most members before it reaches the House floor on July 19.

Abstaining Democratic Committee members, Crockett (D-ME) and Dymally (D-CA), objected to the \$80 million for overt operations. Like other liberal Democrats, they felt this could be a surreptitious way of increasing military aid to El Salvador.

On the other hand, many Republicans objected to the \$80 million on the grounds that it would expand the war in Central America and would not suffice for the interdiction of arms.

Rep. Hamilton (D-IN), in an uncharacteristically passionate speech, spoke for most of the Democrats. "There is very little evidence that this covert action has been effective," he told the HFAC. "It has not prevented the flow of arms into El Salvador. It has enabled the Sandinistas to rally support in the country. It undercuts the U.S. image in the world as a nation that acts legally, fairly, decently, and makes it more difficult for the U.S. to support negotiations."

Rep. Hamilton is searching unsuccessfully for a compromise with bipartisan support. Most Democrats oppose a compromise and advocate unconditional opposition by the House to the President's plan for covert action. The Administration argues, however, that the Senate would not go along with the uncompromised provisions of HR 2760.

In May, the Contadora countries—Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama—met for the third

time in Panama City to establish an agenda for future discussion. This meeting will be remembered for successfully bringing together for the first time the Foreign Ministers of Honduras and Nicaragua.

Following an unexpected meeting in Mexico, the Presidents of the Contadora countries appealed on July 17 to President Reagan and Cuban leader Fidel Castro to join Contadora's efforts to avert a war between Honduras and Nicaragua. They called for a halt to foreign intervention and the withdrawal of all military advisers in Central America. They also declared their opposition to the establishment of foreign military bases and proposed the creation of demilitarized zones in the region.

After their Statigast meeting in June, the countries of the European Economic Community issued a statement supporting the Contadora initiatives. They declared that the problems of Central America cannot be solved by military means. This was echoed by the 13-nation Caribbean Community, which called for an end to foreign intervention in Central America. At a June 4 press conference, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez recommended that the Reagan Administration hold direct talks with the Nicaraguan government, and declared that Washington involvement in Central America was "fundamentally harmful."

International opinion of the covert operations against Nicaragua does not, however, seem to carry much weight with most Republican members of the House, who openly favor any compromise that might keep the covert funding in place. The most likely consequence of further covert funding is a war between Nicaragua and Honduras. Such a conflict would spread through the region and the United States would be forced to send troops.

Members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, recently advised that U.S. intervention in Central America should be contemplated only if the Congress and the American people are squarely behind it. There is little support in Congress for the use of U.S. troops in Central America and 78% of the respondents to a Washington Post/ABC poll (5/25/83) opposed covert operations in Nicaragua. ■

By David Mervin

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Court Decision Hampers Oversight

When the Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto on June 23, and reaffirmed its decision on July 6, it stripped Congress of the main vehicle the legislature had used for a decade to shape U.S. policy toward Latin America. The rulings affect legislation on human rights, foreign aid, arms sales, and the commitment of U.S. troops to hostile areas ("war powers").

The legislative veto enabled Congress to halt the executive's implementation of decisions made under authority granted to it. In all cases, the legislative veto took effect without approval by the president and with no more than a simple majority vote. Some legislative vetoes required an affirmative action by Congress allowing the president to act. Others required a negative vote in order to stop presidential action. Negative vetoes tended to favor presidential discretion because of the difficulty in securing congressional decisions in a limited time.

Several laws that governed U.S. relations with Latin America provided for negative legislative vetoes. Veto power accompanied legislation on: foreign aid, where Congress could terminate a foreign assistance program to any country; human rights, where Congress could override a presidential determination that a country should receive aid for national security reasons despite its record of human rights violations; and arms sales, where Congress could block sales over \$7 million of major weapons to another country, or prevent the transfer of U.S. weapons from one country to a third country.

Historically, Congress has been reluctant to assert itself so strongly in foreign affairs and to deprive presidents of discretion.

Similarly, under the 1973 War Powers Resolution, Congress could call home U.S. troops deployed in an area where hostilities were occurring or seemed imminent. Congress had sixty days to pass such a resolution. The act also specified that the troops would need to be recalled automatically after sixty days if affirmative congressional authorization for their deployment was not granted. This provision may not

have fallen under the Court's ruling, and may still be in force. The law implies that the affirmative congressional authorization for deployment would take the form of a joint resolution, and thus may not violate the Court's new standards.

There is some debate over whether the legislative veto in these laws has restrained the president in Latin America. Congress never invoked any of these vetoes, despite the presence of U.S. troops in El Salvador or human rights abuses by aid recipients such as Haiti. Several analysts contend, however, that without the potential threat of the veto, President Reagan might have approved the sale of military equipment to Guatemala sooner and made it larger, would have sold arms to Argentina, and might even have sent troops into battle in El Salvador. Now he is freer to sell arms, declare that aid to human rights violators is in the U.S. national interest, or commit troops into battle for sixty days.

The Court ruling may also undermine the informal procedure that involved Congress in executive decisions to reprogram earmarked military aid. In order to permit some flexibility in foreign policy decisions, Congress normally does not challenge presidential decisions to reprogram aid from one country to another. This year, though, President Reagan's effort to reprogram \$60 million from Morocco to El Salvador met with congressional resistance. Now, he may use the Court ruling to justify unilateral action, attempting to bypass Congress.

In turn, Congress could rewrite legislation to reduce any reprogramming authority the president might claim by requiring him to obtain a joint resolution of approval before implementing such a decision. This would resemble the affirmative congressional authorization included in the War Powers Resolution. Historically, though, Congress has been reluctant to assert itself so strongly in foreign affairs and to deprive presidents of discretion.

President Reagan may not challenge Congress yet; and he may continue to act as if the legislative veto were still in place by consulting with Congress on Latin American policy. Such self-restraint may disappear, however, if the President feels firmly committed to a policy that Congress opposes. Such circumstances could reveal the enormity of the Supreme Court decision. ■



WOLA Roundup



Sister Lisa Fitzgerald, a religious of the Sacred Heart, visited members of Congress in June. In meetings and discussions, Sister Fitzgerald recounted her first-hand experiences of "contra" actions in Jalapa, Nicaragua, where she has lived and taught since March 1982. She described Jalapa, situated near the border with Honduras, as a town under attack from U.S.-backed "contras," where refugees from the surrounding area swell the population, and where a climate of fear and tension permeates daily life.

On June 28, WOLA Director **Joe Eldridge** testified before the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations (Chairman Gas Yatron, D-PA) on the Reagan Administration's compliance with existing human rights laws which affect U.S. security assistance levels and condition the U.S. executive director's vote on loans from the development banks.

A day later, **Dana Martin**, former missionary to Guatemala, gave testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance (Chairman Jerry M. Patterson, D-CA) on the effects of multilaterally funded development projects on the indigenous population of Guatemala.

Brian Walker, Director General of OXFAM (UK), led a delegation consisting of **Hakan Landelius**, Secretary-General of Raddis Barnen (the Swedish Save the Children Fund) and **Dr. Thom Kerstens**, Director of Foreign Relations of CESEMO, the Dutch Catholic development agency, to Washington.

The commission expressed to U.S. policymakers their grave concern for the current socio-economic situation in Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador. Speaking on behalf of supporters and donors in Europe and of the people they serve in Central America, the delegation emphasized that development efforts are being severely hampered by the increasing conflict in the region.


On June 23, a delegation of representatives from religious and human rights organizations from both Latin America and North America gathered at Georgetown University for a three-day conference on the search for peace in Central America. Fendalstein, a Venezuelan human rights group, joined WOLA and the Maryknoll Fathers in facilitating these joint discussions. Representatives from twelve countries, including bishops from Brazil and Chile, participated in the conference.

VISITORS

- **Dr. Ramon Custodio**, President of the Honduran Human Rights Committee.
- **Emilio Maspero**, Secretary General of the Latin American Confederation of Trade Unions.
- **Charles Meyer**, Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

- **Andres Tinoco and Victor Lopez**, members of Peru's AFSPA Party platform committee.
- **Angela and Federico Westercamp**, human rights workers, whose son, Gustavo, was imprisoned without charges for seven years in Argentina.
- **Jaime and Alma Wright**, Presbyterians working closely with Cardinal Arns and the human rights projects of the Diocese of Sao Paulo in Brazil.
- **Andres Zaldívar**, President of the Christian Democratic World Union.
- **Ruben Zamora**, member of the FMLN FDR Diplomatic Political Commission of El Salvador.

NEW WOLA PUBLICATIONS



- *The Proceedings of a Conference: "U.S. Policies to Accompany the Transition to Democracy in the Southern Cone" (April 1983) \$5.00.*
- *Human Rights Violations in Argentina: Reconciliation or Justification (May 1983) \$1.00.*
- *Witnesses to Political Violence in Guatemala (2nd edition, 1982) \$5.00.*
- *Briefing Manual on Uruguay (June 1983) \$1.00.*
- *U.S. Foreign Policy and Political Developments in El Salvador 1979-1983: a collection of reprinted UPDATE articles (May 1983) \$2.00.*

Guatemala, *continued*

concessions. He fired six young military advisers instrumental in the 1982 coup and replaced with civilians 50 Army officers in high-level government positions.

In addition, on June 30, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was sworn in to oversee elections in July 1984 for a constituent assembly to be installed in September 1984. Whether these measures are sufficient to forestall another coup attempt is yet to be seen. No mention was made of a timetable for presidential elections.

Undoubtedly, there will be powerful lobbying this fall in Congress on behalf of Rios Montt's recent "democratic opening." Congressional debate on aid to Guatemala needs to weigh the electoral gains against the plight of the rural Indians who comprise the majority of Guatemala's population and the roots of civil strife which have driven 70,000 refugees, mostly Indian, into Mexico. The June events in Guatemala, unfortunately, suggest merely a reshuffling of political players without addressing the more fundamental questions of basic human rights and needs. ■

Contributing to this edition were: Leyla Barbieri, Gwilym Beattie, Philip Brenner, Robin Jernigan, Dana Martin, Gail Neuschwander, Reggie Norton, Patti Petesch and George Rogers.

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The Washington Office on Latin America logo is a stylized version of a pre-Incan icon, an anthropomorphized condor which is seen running toward the central figure of the San Gede Viracocha. The icon belongs to the classical horizon, Tiahuanaco, the third of four cultural periods and the highest in art.

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