


ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

Sept. 21

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials	Date
Ballou - Kurahs			
1.	Gary Matthews 		
2.	Charles Fairbanks		
3.	George Lister		
4.			
5.			
Action	File	Note and Return	
Approval	For Clearance	For Conversation	
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply	
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me	
Comment	Investigate	Signature	
Coordination	Justify		

REMARKS

Chile: Socialists/Communists

G.L. - Of the 100 estimates given a decade
 1) your speech to Lister is very good. My fear is that
 he thinks a bit with up with ball - which is false
 2) thought much at when 20% in their interest to be so.

90

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
 clearances, and similar actions.

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
G. Lister	
	Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
 Prescribed by GSA
 FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.606

September 21, 1983

To: Elliott Abrams

Subject: Chile: Socialists/Communists

As you know, I am an old friend of Sergio Biter, Chilean Socialist and formerly Allende's Minister of Mines. I first met him when he testified at a Chile human rights hearing soon after Pinochet's coup. At that time he had every Latin American cliché about the USG. We became good friends. Shortly after Sergio came here from Venezuela on his Woodrow Wilson research assignment (just completed) I invited him to lunch. During our lengthy talk I presented the line of argument set forth in the following paragraph.

I am convinced you and other representatives of the Chilean non-Communist Left are making a bad mistake in assuming that the USG is pro-Pinochet. In my well informed opinion it is neither pro nor anti, although of course there are individual officials who are one or the other (I am anti). By sitting around complaining that the USG is pro-Pinochet you are helping to keep him in power. Your lack of dialogue with the USG is actually harmful. This is a wide open society, essentially democratic, and there are many legitimate opportunities for influencing USG policy, so long as you are not allied with the Communists. When I was First Secretary at Rome I initiated and developed contact with the Italian Socialist Party (with USG approval, of course), urged them to leave the Communists and work in the Italian democratic political arena, to accept leader grants to the U.S. (they had never been here), etc. That worked out splendidly (although I was recommended for selection out of the Service and saved only by Harrison's intervention, as described in Schlesinger's The Thousand Days). Why don't you and your friends come in to talk with Abrams, and develop your opportunities in Congress? I promise to help.

At first Hitar was skeptical of my objectives, apparently suspecting I was proposing some kind of CIA operation or trick. I assured him I do not have a conspiratorial bone in my body and I was definitely not suggesting anything clandestine or undercover. I pointed out he had nothing to lose by trying to improve our Chile policy, which he had been constantly criticizing. We agreed to cooperate.

When I went down to Woodrow Wilson two days ago, to pick up the absurd USIA Information sheet on Subercaseaux, I had another good talk with Hitar, who is leaving. I told him how it had been possible to prevail upon Harkin to praise our July 11 policy statement and put it into the Record, and how that in turn had led to the letter of approval from the 70 Members of the Hill Liberal Establishment, eliciting yet another good response from the Department. Sergio had read all of that and was very pleased. He was also very encouraged by your AIFLD speech, with its comparison of Pinochet and Castro. He felt the talks with you had gone very well, and that we had made much progress indeed.

I then said I thought Valdes was doing a good job with the Democratic Alliance, and that if a Christian Democrat-Socialist coalition government did replace Pinochet I hoped the Communists could be kept out. Sergio said he thought that would be possible, and certainly desirable, but that it would be essential to reach some kind of "political agreement" with the Communists. He referred to the alarming Jackson Diehl article in the September 19 Post (attached), describing widespread deep discontent and anger among Chile's poor and unemployed. Sergio said he feared that such desperation could erupt in violence and explode Chile unless we moved quickly to an effective democratic solution. Thus it was essential to reach some kind of understanding with the Communists, keeping them out of the Government but also avoiding a situation in which the CP would be anti-DCC and in

a position to whip up and exploit popular discontent. There was need for a political arrangement by which the democratic parties could tell the Communists "to cut it out", to stop their agitation.

I left with Sergio a copy of the attached Madrid ABC criticism of Spain's Deputy Prime Minister, Alfonso Guerra, who participated in the September 11 anti-Pinochet demonstration in Madrid, but "forgot" to include Cuba and Nicaragua among the Latin American dictatorships he condemned.

Sergio and I agreed that we would stay in touch, and that he would keep his friends coming here for informal discussion. He sent you an abrazo.

George Lister

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cc: Bob Snyder