TO: ARA - Covey T. Oliver

FROM: ARA - George Lister

SUBJECT: Status Report on Some Policies and Tactics

My July 28 memorandum, drafted at your request, outlined 13 specific recommendations for action. I thought it might be useful also to prepare for your background information a memorandum reviewing a number of other matters which I have dealt with in the past, with varying degrees of success. This is a kind of informal status report of progress already achieved in some fields, submitted as a supplement to the July 28 recommendations. There is some overlapping, but not much.

I have been rather frank, since this memorandum has not been drafted for wide distribution. As you will see, some operations have gone well and only require careful watching from now on, whereas others need much more pushing. For convenience, each subject covered is discussed on a separate page, with attachments showing action taken, policy directives sent out, etc. You may wish to keep some or all of them for handy reference.

The subjects included are the following:

1. Our Visa Policy
2. Educative Diplomacy (US-USSR Relations)
3. Latin American Relations with Communist Governments
4. Exploitation of Communist Broadcasts to Latin America
5. Exploitation of Other Communist Activities
6. Field Contact With Latin Americans
7. Effective Political Dialogue
8. Alertness to Potential Insurgency
9. Protection of U.S. Personnel and Property
10. Explaining Our Policies to the Press

Despite the number of times the word "Communist" appears above, I think you will agree that the main emphasis of the attached papers is on "pro-democratic" themes and tactics, not on sterile anti-Communism.

-CONFIDENTIAL-

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.
1. Our Visa Policy

After considerable difficulty and hard plugging, it has been possible to develop a very liberal and politically sophisticated visa policy for Latin America. We have deliberately and explicitly encouraged ARA posts to recommend even extreme leftists and rightists for inclusion in our own travel programs if they feel that, on balance, such recommendations would be in the national interest. I have drafted several circular airgrams on this subject in recent years. Three are attached: CW-8065 of April 10, 1962, CW-8871 of May 7, 1962, and CA-882 of August 1, 1966. The latter is our most recent instruction and spells out our policy quite clearly.

I have followed actual performance very closely. I must have intervened personally in about 100 visa cases (e.g. Marta Traba's) over the past three years, to make certain that we did not make politically unwise decisions.

Not only have we been able to expose to this country a good number of influential Latin American leftists whose visa applications would have been rejected in past years, but we have also deprived our enemies of many opportunities for propaganda exploitation of our visa refusals as "reactionary". Indeed, we have not only succeeded in getting rid of our old, well known reputation (here as well as in Latin America) of denying visas to all leftists, but we have even caused the Communists to issue numerous public statements warning Latin Americans to watch out for our "new" visa policy and the "new Yankee offensive on the cultural front". This kind of response is always a reassuring and heart warming sign that our tactics are sound.

One of our most gratifying successes was achieved through urging Santiago Embassy (plus SCA/VO and INS) to allow Pablo Neruda to attend last year's International P.E.N. Congress, in New York City (mentioned on page 13 of my July 28 memorandum). I have attached my original February 10, 1966 memorandum on this subject and the subsequent cable to Santiago.
As you will see from the other attachments to this section, Neruda came without visa difficulty. Moscow refused to allow Soviet observers to come. The American President of P.E.N. publicly praised "President Johnson and the State Department for a new policy". The Cuban Communists sent an open letter to Neruda, reprimanding him for attending, urging "a state of alert throughout Latin America against the new Yankee imperialist penetration in the field of culture", and darkly warning that "it would be well to inquire into the reasons that induced the United States to issue a visa to Pablo Neruda after twenty years of refusing". There were also excellent repercussions elsewhere in Latin America, as shown in the attached Lima airgram.

Our Latin American visa policy is going well. Occasionally I still discover cases in which a post is recommending a visa turndown simply because an applicant is a leftist, but this does not happen very much anymore (some leftists and rightists should be refused visas, of course).

**Recommended Action:**

I see no need for further policy directives, and I recommend we simply continue following the present effective tactics.
2. Educatice Diplomacy on US-USSR Relations and World Communism

When I joined ARA, started reading our reporting from the field, and began meeting visiting groups here, I was struck by the amount of misunderstanding and misinformation in Latin America regarding the complex subjects of US-USSR relations and developments in the international Communist movement. Our relations with Moscow had improved in some respects but not in others; polycentrism had progressed considerably, and yet the Latin American approach to these matters seemed extremely uninformed, parochial and broad-brush. At the same time, it was natural for EUR and its Embassies to follow these subjects much more closely than ARA and our field posts. Thus, there was danger of costly confusion and policy inconsistencies on all sides.

It was with this in mind that I have made a special effort to alert our posts to the importance of keeping abreast of developments in the international Communist movement and in our relations with the USSR and other Communist countries, as well as of conducting educative diplomacy on these subjects in Latin America. As an example, there is attached a copy of CA-12869 of June 9, 1964 (sent worldwide), which discussed these subjects and called attention to such publications as Problems of Communism (published in Spanish) and to Secretary Rusk’s February 25, 1964 speech, “Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently”.

One useful development has been the assignment of several first class officers with Eastern European experience to Latin America (for example, at Caracas, Santiago and Asuncion). Several of our ARA Embassies follow international Communist developments quite closely, and make a useful contribution in this respect vis-a-vis host governments and local public opinion.

Recommended Action:

Periodic guidance and reminders from the Department should be quite adequate for the foreseeable future.
3. Latin American Relations with Communist Governments

Most Communist governments, and particularly those in Europe, have long been conducting a determined campaign to expand and strengthen their diplomatic, commercial, cultural and other relations and contacts with, and in, Latin American countries, and thereby to increase Communist penetration, activity and influence in this hemisphere. Our policies and views on this complicated subject are not well understood in Latin America—not even by Latin American governments to say nothing of the people. There is a widespread assumption that we are "obsessed" by Communism and against all Communist relations with Latin America. It is also widely assumed that we are trying to prevent all Latin American-Eastern European trade because we want to monopolize Latin American markets and keep our neighbors in the status of economic colonies (this is an accusation made at almost every one of my meetings with visiting groups). Lastly, some of our own ARA posts are not always clear on our policies on this subject.

CA-7259 of January 18, 1965, on "Latin American Relations with Communist Governments", spelled out all of these questions in great detail.

Recommended Action:

I have just reviewed CA-7259, and I find it requires no significant change. However, it is often useful to call this and other basic policy references to the attention of our Embassies.
4. Exploitation of Communist Broadcasts to Latin America

It is important and useful for ARA Embassies to follow Communist broadcasting to Latin America, not only from Cuba but also from Moscow and other Communist capitals. These broadcasts provide very timely information on Communist tactics and propaganda themes, and also reveal and reflect highly significant developments inside the international Communist movement. Secondly, and just as important, they offer opportunities for exploitation against the Communists.

There are attached some documents as examples of what I mean. You will note that my February 18, 1966 cable (number 1361) to Rio called attention to a February 12 Soviet broadcast which was offensive to the Brazilian Government as well as to Ambassador Gordon. I pointed out that this might provide a basis for Brazilian protest to the Soviets, and for action along the lines of my circular 1504 of February 9 (attached), which had urged exploiting the Tri-Continental Conference as a means of reducing foreign Communist presence in Latin America. The attached March 8 cable (1378) shows how the Portuguese language tapes of the Soviet broadcasts were airmailed to Rio. The tapes were given to the Brazilian Government and, as a result, the local Soviet representative of Izvestiya and Radio Moscow was expelled with 48 hours notice.

As stated in the first paragraph, it is essential for our posts to follow Communist broadcasts, not only for purposes of information but also to find opportunities for this type of exploitation. The Soviets and other Communists are quite ready to conduct "friendly" formal diplomatic relations with Latin American governments while broadcasting attacks against them directly to the people in the language of the country. And Moscow has long operated on the confident assumption that, in most cases, the local governments and political parties are too parochial to even follow the broadcasts.

After investigating exactly how and where the FBIS coverage is handled, I went into this entire subject in detail in CA-8821 of May 16, 1967 (attached), on "Exploitation and
Monitoring of Communist Broadcasts to Latin America. ARA Embassies were alerted to the problem and to the opportunities for countering this kind of Communist activity. It was explained that tape recordings of broadcasts would be sent promptly on request. There was enclosed a list showing the extent of Communist broadcasting to Latin America by country.

Some of our Embassies have already shown they are making good use of this material. I also arranged to have all Embassies air pouched not only the FBIS Daily Report of Latin American broadcasts but also the Daily Report of USSR and East Europe broadcasts to Latin America.

Recommended Action:

Nothing more need be done from here at this time.
5. **Exploitation of Other Communist Activities**

Other aspects of Communist performance should also be exploited, both by the Department and the field, and it is essential to accustom our ARA posts to thinking and acting along these lines. Some examples of the sort of exploitation I mean are set forth below.

As you know, Moscow is attempting to extend Soviet and other Communist air access in Latin America. My circular cable on this subject, 120639 of January 12, is attached. Also attached is a January 1967 memorandum drafted for Lincoln Gordon to Tony Solomon on the same topic. Page 3 of the memorandum pointed out various undesirable Soviet activities which might be brought up by a Latin American government in response to any Russian request for an air agreement. My CA-9079 of May 26 (attached) informed our Embassies regarding the espionage activities conducted by Aeroflot representatives in Europe, and suggested posts might wish to pass on such information to any host governments which seemed likely to enter into negotiations with the Soviets over the extension of Aeroflot services.

On June 8, 1967 I drafted a memorandum (attached) urging that appropriate unattributed publicity be arranged in Latin America regarding the extensive intelligence operations conducted by personnel of Novosti, the Soviet press agency.

The Tri-Continental Conference provided excellent opportunities for exploitation. Circular telegram 1504 of February 9, 1966 (attached) shows the tactics recommended for reducing foreign Communist presence, as well as local Communist effectiveness, in Latin America. You will note that EUR/SOV sent us a memorandum stating that they were using my cable as a model for similar messages to AF, NEA and FE posts. At all events, we did succeed in exploiting the Tri-Continental very effectively in Latin America against the Soviets, Cubans and local Communists.

The two attached cables on LASO (2545 of July 7 and 23334 of August 18) spelled out similar opportunities in the field.
in connection with that conference. Montevideo Embassy's cables 399 of August 21 and 429 of August 23 (attached) reported the Embassy's success in using my instruction so as to influence the Uruguayan Government to prohibit the holding of the Communist controlled labor congress which had been scheduled to begin in Montevideo on August 29. The Uruguayan authorities specifically justified this action on the basis of LASO. I will draft a message congratulating the Embassy on its success, with copies to all other ARA Embassies to encourage similar energy elsewhere.

Still another example of this type of activity was provided in the circular telegram 201555 of May 24 (attached) I sent out, urging exploitation of a May 21 Pravda article. Lima's 5628 of May 29 (attached) shows the Embassy used the article effectively with the Peruvian Foreign Office, which even asked for more material of this type.

I think we have made substantial progress in accustoming both our posts and the Latin Americans to thinking and acting along these lines.

**Recommended Action:**

We will continue to point out initiatives which might be taken in the field, but no specific action is recommended at this time.
6. Field Contact With Latin Americans

There is still a natural and human tendency on our part in some Latin American countries to neglect or avoid contact with significant local political and other elements which are critical of our policies, or basically unfriendly to the United States, or just out of power. Sometimes there is also a tendency to neglect contact with some sectors of the population, such as intellectuals and artists, which are not officially and directly involved in local politics but which can often exert enormous influence. The results of these mistakes of omission can prove painful and costly.

There is attached a copy of CA-621 of July 19, 1965, on "Contact With Latin Americans", which requested each ARA Embassy to answer specific questions on this subject. My main thought in sending it out was as explained in the preceding paragraph. The immediate impetus was twofold. I had just spent May in Santo Domingo, during the tragic and dangerous crisis there, and high ranking Bosch supporters had complained to me that they had enjoyed little or no contact with top Embassy officials for more than a year preceding the April, 1965 uprising. Secondly, I had just attended a Latin American Policy Committee meeting in which it became quite clear that we could not discuss the views and aspirations of Bolivian miners because our personnel in that country had no contact with them.

All Embassies replied to CA-621 and some of the responses were helpful and enlightening. It was salutary to alert our posts to the risks involved in neglecting contacts with certain significant elements of the population, particularly leftists. However, this is a matter which requires constant watching.

Recommended Action:

No further action is recommended at this time.
7. **Effective Political Dialogue**

This subject was discussed as point 5 of my July 28 memorandum of recommendations for action and is only included here as part of this status report.

CA-10716 of April 9, 1965, on "Effective Political Dialogue with Latin Americans", explained in detail the need for more and better political dialogue with Latin Americans. It also provided a specific ideological presentation of our policies and objectives, for use in the field. CA-1285 of August 13, 1966 reminded ARA Embassies of the importance of this work.

A few Embassies have been making good use of local opportunities for conducting the dialogue, but others have not. However, this is not a traditional type of activity in our Foreign Service, and it does not come easily to most Americans. Nor are most of our ARA posts likely to appreciate the value and possibilities of this kind of activity. Therefore, we shall have to keep watching and encouraging performance in the field. As stated in my July 28 memorandum, I propose to send out another brief follow-up instruction this year.

With the September 11 memorandum from you to Jim Fowler, requesting inclusion of Latin American AID training participants, we have started expanding the scope of the meetings conducted up here, and organizing them on a logical basis. I will be moving ahead with inclusion of Peace Corps volunteers, Embassy personnel, etc., in accordance with your stated wishes.

Apropos of all of the above, you will remember that when I came down to Bogota I consulted with you regarding the pamphlet USIA had asked me to prepare, setting forth many of the points I try to get across in my regular meetings. You made some suggestions at that time and I worked them into the text. I am sure you will be pleased to know that
distribution of the pamphlet has been going very well, not only in Latin America but also in translations in many other countries. You will note from the attached May 9 USIA letter that, as of that date, 55,000 copies had been distributed in Latin America alone. The attached December 3, 1966 letter details republication in countries outside the hemisphere, such as India, Japan, and Italy.

Recommended Action:

This is an operation which requires repeated initiatives and close watching. However, in view of your strong support for "the dialogue", we should be able to make steady progress along the lines indicated above.
3. Alertness to Potential Insurgency

As discussed on pages 4 and 5 of my July 28 memorandum, we have finally succeeded in putting through policy documents emphasizing the importance of anticipating and preventing guerrilla operations. CA-9309 of June 5, 1967, on "Alertness to Potential Insurgency" (attached), spelled out the problem and requested all ARA Embassies to estimate the possibility of guerrilla preparations and the possibility of their knowing of such preparations. All Embassies except Georgetown have answered. Most of the replies were well prepared and responsive, and the field has now been alerted sufficiently to make a repetition of our unsatisfactory performance in Bolivia considerably less likely. CA-1818 of September 2 (attached), discussed Embassy replies and clarified some possible misunderstandings.

CA-9309 (paragraph 5A) also requested our Embassies to report on host government intelligence and utilization capabilities, and to recommend the types of training and follow-through guidance the United States might provide. Most Embassy replies on this subject were good. We have not yet reviewed the replies and commented on the recommendations. I assume this will be done by ARA/IAS.

We still have not implemented the recommendation set forth on page 1 of my April 27 memorandum on "Preventing Outbreaks of Guerrilla Warfare", in favor of an inter-agency consultation and review here in Washington "as to how we and the Latin Americans can be more effective in making it harder for guerrilla movements to get started". I think such a review is just as necessary here as it was in the field.

Recommended Action:

This is another operation which requires close watching, although I think we are far more alert and less vulnerable than we were several months ago.

As indicated above, we should respond to field recommendations made in accordance with paragraph 5A of CA-9309.

Perhaps IRG/COIN can handle the Washington inter-agency consultation and review recommended above.
9. Protection of U.S. Personnel and Property

Attached is an October 19, 1964 memorandum I sent to Bob Adams following the daring and spectacular PALN kidnapping of Lieutenant Colonel Michael Smolen, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Air Force Mission, of our Caracas Embassy. I thought at that time that it might be useful to alert other ARA posts to the possibility of similar Communist tactics in their countries. In accordance with a January 5, 1965 memorandum (attached) from Tom Mann, a Watch Committee was formed to review policies and procedures, to keep on top of threats against persons and property, and to remind field missions to take appropriate preventive action. Numerous letters were sent out to the field. Eventually, rather elaborate inter-agency consultation here in Washington reviewed procedures and produced appropriate documents. A memorandum on one May, 1965 inter-agency meeting is attached as a sample. O/SY was, and still is, charged with the main responsibility in this field.

It is my impression that this operation has worked quite well. However, we may be in for a sharp increase of attacks on our personnel and property, as an aftermath of the LASO Conference.

Recommended Action:

We might send out a follow-up alert to ARA Embassies if we receive enough reports and rumors of plans for action against our personnel and property.
10. Explaining Our Policies to the Press

One of the things which has concerned me ever since coming into ARA has been the unfortunate frequency with which our own press misunderstands and misinterprets our Latin American policies and tactics. I understand, of course, that some of this is inevitable. But much of it is not, and I doubt that we realize how costly some of our press coverage is to our interests, both at home and abroad. I have written frequently on this subject. Two specific instances are discussed briefly below.

When Tom Mann took over ARA in early 1964 he held a conference of ARA Ambassadors, for classified consultation and policy discussions. The meetings went well, but the press coverage was most unfortunate. I think that, to a great extent, this happened because not enough thought was given to how to explain and interpret the conference to the press. And I am afraid that almost no consideration was given to the danger of sincere misinterpretation by our friends in Latin America and deliberate distortion by our enemies. As it turned out, there was an unfortunate reaction in this country and the Communists enjoyed a propaganda field day by exploiting our alleged new "pragmatic" policy of cooperating with right wing dictatorships, etc. I believe that almost all of this could have been avoided if we had not underestimated the importance of explaining the conference and our policies to the press in a way which would be politically helpful to us abroad and at home.

I have attached a March 26, 1964 memorandum which I wrote to Tom Mann on the subject, going into some detail.

A much more recent example of our poor use of the domestic press was reflected in Jerry O'Leary's February 3 article on the Nicaraguan elections (attached). O'Leary is very cooperative and during the last three years ARA had made a habit of using him for placing stories and intentional leaks. Indeed, calling in O'Leary seems to be almost a knee-jerk reaction in the Bureau. Therefore, it is not as if he were a hostile reporter deliberately trying to make trouble for us. And yet, as pointed out in my attached February 9
memorandum, his report of our views and comments on the Nicaraguan elections "could hardly have been better calculated to serve Communist purposes". I doubt that Havana could have improved very much on the article as an interpretation of our Latin American policies.

In conclusion, I think I should add that I have never seen anyone get off to as good a start as you have with the U.S. and Latin American press. So I realize we are in for a period of prosperity.

Recommended Action:

I think it would be useful to prepare a brief memorandum on this general subject for relevant offices without, of course, mentioning the specific examples discussed above. If you agree, I will prepare a draft for your signature.