Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image

Draft (January 2009 Version)

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“[T]he number of cases coming before the Supreme Court grew steadily since 1925, while the number of cases the Court decides has been in steady decline.”

“One of the most striking aspects of the [Supreme Court’s] declining plenary docket is that it coincides with an unprecedented expansion in the dockets of the lower courts, particularly the United States Courts of Appeals. While the Supreme Court’s plenary docket is approximately half as large in 2004 as it was in 1986, the dockets of the federal circuit courts have increased by 82.4% during that same period.”

“I do think there's room for the court to take more cases. They hear about half the number of cases they did 25 years ago. There may be good reasons for that that I'll learn if I am confirmed but, just looking at it from the outside, I think they could contribute more to the clarity and uniformity of the law by taking more cases.”

INTRODUCTION

Max Weber is nowhere to be found in the Supreme Court library, but you’ll probably find Thorstein Veblen on the shelves. The current Supreme Court – surely among the least active courts in history – has apparently rejected Weber’s “protestant work ethic” in favor of Veblen’s “conspicuous leisure.”

It wasn’t always thus. Historically, the Court decided many more cases – both in absolute terms and as a percentage of its docket – than it has recently. In 1930, for example, the Court decided 235 cases (or 18% of its docket); in 1945, it decided 170 cases (or 11.6% of its docket); and as recently as 1985, the Court decided 161 cases (or 3% of its docket). This contrasts with the 2007 Term, in which the Court decided only 67 cases by full opinion, less than one percent of its docket.

5. See, e.g., Richard Brust, Supreme Court 2.0, ABA J., Oct. 2008, at 39 (quoting Professor Paul Carrington stating that current Supreme Court justices “don’t have to do too much work” and that the job of a justice is “no sweat”); Philip D. Oliver, Increasing the Size of the Court As a Partial but Clearly Constitutional Alternative, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 405, 411, 412 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds. 2006) (observing that “the job of justice seems much easier than in the recent past” and describing the position as “cushy”)[hereinafter REFORMING THE COURT].
9. We use the term case in the conventional sense to mean issued decisions, treating each opinion of the Court as one case. In its own statistics, the Court treats opinions that resolve multiple docket numbers as that
Even though it possesses resources unimaginable to its predecessors, including computers, enhanced communication technology, and a bevy of talented clerks, the current Supreme Court decides only a trickle of cases.

In this Essay, we argue that Congress should expand the Court’s decision-making capacity by implementing three features of U.S. Court of Appeals decisionmaking. First, we argue that the Court should increase its membership so that it is comparable in size to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, seconding an argument made by others including Jonathan Turley. These courts have, on average, 13 authorized judgeships per circuit (ranging from 6 authorized judgeships on the First Circuit to 29 on the Ninth Circuit). Second, as we have argued in a recently published essay, the Court should hear most of its cases in panels, rather than as a full Court. (This change, standing alone, could at least double and perhaps even triple the Supreme Court’s decision-making capacity, while having only a negligible impact on Court outcomes.) Third, the Court should retain the authority to grant en banc review in the small fraction of cases that call for the Court to speak as a full body.

By embracing these changes—that is, by increasing the number of Justices on the Supreme Court and by adopting the practice of panel decision-making with an en banc procedure available for selected cases—the Supreme Court could expand its decision-making capacity dramatically. Expanded decision-making capacity, if exercised, offers several benefits, including greater clarity and consistency in the law. And, a Court with greater capacity, whether exercised or not, also would act as a more reliable check and balance on the other branches. But even if the Court opted not to exercise its expanded capacity and continued to hear only a handful of cases each year, our proposal would offer several other benefits, including a more credible threat of review, a more dynamic Court, and a more representative and diverse membership.

To develop our argument, this Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we make our case for capacity. We identify three reasons — clarity, consistency, and checks and balances — why the number of cases.

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11. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Unpacking the Court: The Case for the Expansion of the United States Supreme Court in the Twenty-first Century, 33 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL SCIENCE 155 (2004); see also Philip D. Oliver, supra note 5, at ### (identifying Court expansion as an option if it is impossible to impose term limits on Justices).

12. This is the median number of judges, a more representative statistic than the mean which is skewed by the Ninth which has grown even bigger. Congress transferred one judgeship from the D.C. Circuit to the Ninth Circuit effective January 21, 2009 (for the Ninth). Act of January 7, 2008, 121 Stat. 2543.


14. Id. at __.

15. Id. at __.
Court should have, and should use, additional decision-making capacity. Having made the case for capacity in Part I, we propose in Part II that Congress expand the Court’s capacity by adopting the three-pronged approach to decisionmaking identified above: expand the Court’s size, adopt panel decisionmaking, and retain limited en banc review. In Part III, we argue that remaking the Court in this fashion will produce other benefits, which, coupled with the prospective capacity gains, trump the concerns this proposal might raise. We conclude with some general observations about Supreme Court decisionmaking.

Our broader goal in this Essay, as in our other work on Supreme Court decisionmaking, is to question the Court’s “institutional design”—the rules, norms, and other practices that determine how an organization operates.16 Questioning the Court’s institutional design might seem heretical to some Court watchers, but it shouldn’t. In contrast to Articles I17 and II18 of the Constitution, which describe in some detail how the legislative and executive branches are to function, Article III says almost nothing about the institutional design of the Supreme Court.19 This Constitutional silence gives Congress and the Court license to alter the Court’s practices and procedures, and historically, they have taken full advantage. In its early years, the Court’s jurisdiction,20 courtroom practices,21 size,22 and composition23 changed significantly and with


17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year” and setting forth the qualifications for a Representative); id. § 3 (providing that “[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state . . . for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote” and setting forth the qualifications for a Senator); id. § 5 (setting “a majority of each [House]” as “a quorum to do business” and allowing that “a small number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members”)

18. Id. art. II, § 1 (detailing the method of election of and the qualifications for the President).

19. Id. (assigning the judicial power to a “supreme Court” but making no provision as to qualifications or number of judges for this Court and offering no guidance as to the Court’s internal organization or procedures).


21. For a discussion of one such change – that is, the evolution of oral argument practice in the Court, see generally David G. Savage, Joan Biskupic & Elder Witt, Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court 848-507, 792-97 (4th ed. 2004); Timothy R. Johnson, Oral Arguments and Decision Making on the United States Supreme Court (2004).

22. The Court’s membership has ranged from six to ten Justices. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (six Justices); Judiciary Act of 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420, 421 (seven); Judiciary Act of 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176, 176 (nine); Judiciary Act of 1863, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794, 794 (ten); Judiciary Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209 (seven); Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44 (nine). As part of major reorganization of the federal courts in 1801, Congress decreased the Court’s size to five Justices (four Associate Justices and the Chief Justice). Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89. As the Court had six justices protected by life tenure at the time of the legislation, the smaller Court size would not take effect until the next Court vacancy; however, the Act was repealed in 1802 before a vacancy had occurred. Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 132.

23. The qualifications and characteristics of the Justices have changed markedly over time, both demographically (e.g., age, race, religion, gender) and professionally (e.g., educational, judicial experience, political experience). Where justices were once all white, Protestant men, today the Court includes justices who are
some frequency. In recent years, however, the Court’s structure and practices have remained largely static, with very few meaningful changes in the Court’s design. In rather stark contrast to the historical Supreme Court, the modern Supreme Court has come to seem fixed or untouchable, more like a museum without an acquisition budget than the complex political institution it is.

This stasis has not gone unnoticed. Recently, some commentators have begun to recommend changes to the Court’s institutional design, motivated in no small measure by the Court’s stagnation. Among other proposals, commentators have advocated mandatory retirement; term limits; “circuit riding”; cameras in the courtroom; alterations in judicial selection procedures; and so on. We applaud these commentators for questioning the Court’s institutional design, and in this Essay, we attempt to make our own modest contribution to this endeavor by advancing our three-pronged approach to Supreme Court decisionmaking.

The proposal we advance in this Essay might seem far-fetched because it challenges a widely held conception of the Supreme Court – nine justices, sitting together, rendering decisions as a full body. In fact, however, our proposal is quite modest. In contrast to several of the other proposals that have been advanced, ours would not require a Constitutional amendment. Moreover, our proposal, again in contrast to several of the others, is consistent both with the Court’s own history and with the practices of courts of last resort in other jurisdictions. Thus, as preposterous as it might sound at first blush, the decision-making proposal we advance in this Essay is not so far-fetched after all.

African-American, female, Catholic, and/or Jewish. For judicial background, see Epstein et al, supra note. At one time, a law degree – any degree – was not a prerequisite for appointment to the Court. But every Justice since 1941 (when FDR appointed Robert Jackson who had none) has had both undergraduate and law degrees. See id. Circuit court experience is a more recent de facto prerequisite. See Tracey E. George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory, 86 N. Car. L. Rev. 1333, 1336-40 (2008) (describing the change in the norm of prior federal judicial experience for Supreme Court justices).

24. See REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 5;
26. See generally REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 5, .
28. See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, Let the Sun Shine on the Supreme Court, 35 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 161 (2008)
29. See, e.g., Terri L. Peretti, Promoting Equity in the Distribution of Supreme Court Appointments, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 5, at 435 (advocating a guaranteed Supreme Court appointment in each presidential term).
30. Term limits, for example, would be contrary to Article III’s provision of life tenure for judges selected for the Supreme Court and inferior courts created pursuant to Article III.
31. The most obvious examples of such proposals are term limits and mandatory retirement ages (separate, but related proposals). Both directly conflict with Article III’s promise of life tenure and thus would require a constitutional amendment. And, they also are contrary to developments in judicial selection for state high courts, which generally have moved to grant life tenure (or terms comparable to life tenure).
I. The Case for Capacity

The most striking feature of contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence is how little of it there is. Originally, the Court, like many other appellate courts, had a mandatory docket. In response to the Court’s staggering caseload following the Civil War, Congress granted the Court discretion over a portion of its docket in 1891. That discretion was substantially expanded in 1925 to a level comparable to that the justices enjoy today. For the next twenty-five years, the Court heard a significant number (and percentage) of the cases it was asked to hear. The Court typically heard 112 to 164 cases – or roughly 16 to 21 percent of the petitions on its paid docket – each year. The percentage of cases granted review dropped below 10 percent for the first time in 1968; but, the justices continued to hear more than 100 cases annually until 1992, at which point the Court’s decision-making output began to dwindle. In the Seventies, the Court granted review to more than 200 cases per term. But after 1992, the justices granted full plenary review to fewer than 100 cases, averaging 90 cases annually since that time. From a peak of 299 cases in 1971, the Court heard only one-quarter as many cases 25 years later.

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35. See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions & Developments tbls. 2–5 (4th ed. 2006). The range is one standard deviation above and below the average for the period.


37. Id.
By hearing so few cases, the Court has neglected the many obligations it faces as a co-
equal branch of government and the pinnacle of the judiciary. To enable the Court to better
fulfill those obligations, Congress should provide the Court with more opportunities to conduct
review. Expanded decision-making capacity would offer several benefits, which we group
loosely into three categories: clarity, consistency, and checks and balances.

A. Clarity

Expanded decisionmaking capacity, if exercised by the Court, would promote greater
clarity in the law, as Chief Justice Roberts observed during his Senate Confirmation hearings.38
The Court could provide greater clarity in the law in at least two critical ways.

First, if the Court decided more cases, it would undoubtedly correct more errors
committed by lower courts. Like all appellate courts, the Supreme Court bears at least some
responsibility for monitoring lower court decisions and remedying errors that litigants bring to
the Court’s attention.39 While the Court cannot correct every error, it should strive, at a
minimum, to correct those that are so substantial as to “depart[] from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings.”40 With expanded decision-making capacity, the Court would be
able to hear many more cases and remedy many more legal errors, thereby ensuring greater
clarity in the law.

Second, the Court provides greater clarity in the law not only by deciding cases but also
by providing reasons for those decisions. The Court, in other words, is not merely a dispute
resolution body—it is also a “reason-giving” body. Through its decisions, the Court explains the
law and thereby offers guidance for how future cases should be treated.41 If the Court decided
more cases, it would issue more majority opinions and speak to a wider array of subjects,
providing more clarity about the rules that govern citizen behavior.

38. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.


40. SUP. CT. R. 10(a). We of course are not asserting that the Supreme Court’s primary function is as a
court of error correction. A single institution, even with panels, could not correct error in the more than 30,000 cases
decided on the merits by the federal courts of appeals and the many more issued by state high courts. See ADMIN.
terminated 30, 742 cases on the merits for the one-year period ending September 2008); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECTS: STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, tbl. 17 (2007), available at
the total number of dispositions by signed opinion by state for state courts of last resort and, where applicable, state
intermediate appellate courts). Instead we are pointing out that the Court does have a responsibility to correct error
that undermines the clarity, predictability, and uniformity of national law (as Rule 10 acknowledges); cf. Stephen G.
Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from the Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91,
92 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court is not a court of error correction per se).

41. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641 (1995) (arguing that in a common-
law system the reasons given for a court’s decision for or against a particular party matter more than the decision
itself).
**B. Consistency**

With greater capacity, the Court could also produce a more uniform or consistent federal law, as Chief Justice Roberts also noted at his Senate Confirmation hearing. The Supreme Court, as the *supreme* judicial body, is responsible for addressing “circuit splits” which arise when two or more courts of appeals interpret the same law differently. As lower federal court dockets have expanded, circuit splits have increased. Over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has cited a circuit conflict as the reason for granting review in more than one-third of its cases. Despite the attention given to circuit splits, however, the Court is currently unable to address even half of those identified by litigants because the Court hears so few cases.

Circuit splits create uncertainties in the law, lead to outcomes in which similarly situated litigants are treated differently, encourage forum shopping, and cause other problems. Indeed, litigants are treated differently, encourage forum shopping, and cause other problems. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been cited a circuit conflict as the reason for granting review in more than one-third of its cases. Despite the attention given to circuit splits, however, the Court is currently unable to address even half of those identified by litigants because the Court hears so few cases.

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42. See *supra* note 4 and accompanying text.*See* text accompanying note __, *supra*. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s responsibility to maintain uniformity in federal law, see, e.g., Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, *The Need for a New National Court*, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1405–07 (1987) (describing how the Court took on this responsibility as part of the expansion of the federal docket and the federal judicial system itself); Breyer, *supra* note __, at 92 (“[T]he Supreme Court is charged with providing a uniform rule of federal law in areas that require one.”).

43. Supreme Court Rule 10 includes as a compelling reason to grant a petition that “a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter” or “that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort.” SUP. CT. R. 10(a). The Supreme Court appears sensitive to Rule 10’s position as reflected in the fact that it is far more likely to grant a petition if the case involves a direct conflict between circuits. See Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, *Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc*, 9 SUP. CT. ECONOMIC REV. 171, 195 tbl.4 (2001) (reporting the results from a multivariate analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari). For the purposes of that study, George and Solimine defined a circuit split as a case in which any judge on panel which decided the case below “explicitly stated [in a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion] that another circuit or circuits had reached a different decision in analogous circumstances” and moreover the judge described the conflict as direct rather than a matter of mere inconsistency. *See* id. at 188.


45. *See* George & Solimine, *supra* note 43, at 195 tbl.4 (reporting, based on a random sample of en banc and panel decisions in circuit courts, that 14 out of 71 en banc cases and 34 out of 213 panel cases involved a direct circuit conflict); Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, *The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases*, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 135, 142 (2006) (estimating, as part of a study of the Supreme Court’s treatment of cases involving splits, that at least 16% of circuit cases from 1985–1995 included a split); see *also* A. Benjamin Spencer, *Split Circuits Blog*, http://splitcircuits.blogspot.com (last visited December 1, 2008) (“tracking developments concerning splits among the federal circuit courts” and demonstrating, in a uniquely modern way, the size of the problem).


47. *See* George & Solimine, *supra* note 43, at 193 tbl.2 (finding that the Court granted certiorari to less than half of the petitions in their study that demonstrated a direct conflict between circuits and further finding that this included en banc cases which presumably involve issues of greater importance).

courts, Congress, and commentators have long worried about circuit splits and attempted to devise various ways of addressing them, including proposing the creation of a new court solely for that purpose. Congress granted the Court discretion over the majority of its jurisdiction in order to allow the Court to focus on maintaining uniformity of law. If the Supreme Court were able to hear more cases, it could perform this function better, providing greater consistency across the circuits.

Uncertainty is not limited to direct conflicts in circuit decisions, but can involve ongoing litigation where there is a significant ground for difference of opinion on a substantial question and where the circuit’s incorrect resolution may be costly. The Supreme Court Rules already envision a procedure by which circuits may seek the Court’s input prior to the circuit’s resolution of a question. Rule 19 allows a court of appeals to “certify to [the Supreme] Court a question or proposition of law on which it seeks instruction for the proper decision of a case.” Congress authorized appellate jurisdiction over questions certified by courts of appeals when it created these intermediate appellate courts in 1891 and continued to do so through a century of revisions to the Court’s jurisdiction.

Although certification gives justices the authority to respond to “live” questions from circuit judges, the justices no longer use that power with any regularity, discouraging circuit certification as they do certiorari petitions by refusing to hear them. This is unfortunate as certification today could be even more valuable than it was 100 years ago when the Supreme

Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 544 (1989) (explaining why “a high degree of consistency and predictability in the law is necessary to the successful operation of the legal system”).


50. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1685, 1698 (2000) (recounting the testimony of Justices Taft and Van Devanter to Congress on how the expansion of the Court’s discretion over its jurisdiction would increase uniformity of the law).


52. 28 U.S.C §1254 (2006) (delineating that “[c]ases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court” by either of two methods—the first being a writ of certiorari from a party and the second being “[b]y certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired.”)

53. See 17A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure Jurisdiction § 1438 (3d 2008) (“It is noteworthy that Congress chose to retain the certification jurisdiction even as it was abolishing virtually all of the appeal jurisdiction.”).

54. Technically, the Court refuses to entertain these requests for review in different ways: It dismisses certified questions and refuses to grant certiorari petitions. For a discussion of the history of circuit certification, see Hartnett, supra note 50, at 1650–57; Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Supreme Court’s New Rules, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 20, 66 (1954).
Court was more receptive to such requests. As with interlocutory appeals in the courts of appeals, certification allows the Court to address a specific question where the law is doubtful, increasing the probability of a correct outcome below. Likewise, the Court may allow for more timely and cost-effective resolution of substantial cases by intervening to answer a limited question prior to the circuit’s complete determination of all issues posed by an appeal (and before the possible remand to the trial court). Certification also offers a powerful and credible signal of a new and important question that merits Court resolution. Indeed, Professor Hartnett has argued that the Court has ignored congressional intent to grant circuit courts of appeals some influence over the Court’s docket. Expanded capacity could support revisiting the certification mechanism.

C. Checks and Balances

If the Court possessed more decision-making capacity, it could also play a more active separation-of-powers role. Under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court (along with the rest of the federal judiciary) comprises a third and ostensibly coequal branch of government, charged with providing a “check” on the other two branches. Of the three branches, the judiciary is arguably the weakest because it lacks both resources (in contrast to the legislative branch) and enforcement power (in contrast to the executive branch). Relative to the other branches, the Supreme Court also produces little law. During George W. Bush’s presidency, Congress passed nearly two thousand public laws. Bush himself contributed more than one-half-million pages to the Federal Register, submitted more than 100 treaties to the Senate, and issued approximately 300 executive orders. During roughly the same period, the Supreme Court decided fewer than 600 cases. If the Court’s decisionmaking capacities expanded, it could play a much more prominent role in policing the actions of the other branches.

55. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 53, at 1675–76 (reporting that 85 certified cases were docketed between 1927 and 1936, but only 20 from 1937 to 1946. Only 3 certified cases have been docketed in recent years.); Wiener, supra note 54, at 66 (“The certificate, once a fruitful source of cases heard by the Court, has dwindled in importance over the years, and recently there has been, on an average, only one certificate per Term.”).


57. See Hartnett, supra note 50, ; see also Moore & Vestal, supra note 56, at 21 (describing certification as “the tool given to the courts of appeals”).

58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).

59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

60. See The Library of Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/bbs/d110/d110laws.html and http://thomas.loc.gov/home/multicongress/multicongress.html (noting that public laws “make up most of the laws passed by Congress” and providing access to the public laws passed by the 107th through 110th Congress).


62. See The Library of Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.html (containing treaties that were submitted to the Senate during the 107th through 110th Congress).


64. See Figure 1 supra and accompanying notes.
Closely related to its role as a coequal branch of the federal government, the Supreme Court also provides a check on state courts.65 Indeed, the Supreme Court is the only federal court empowered to review state court interpretations of federal law, including the U.S. Constitution. When it does so, the Court plays an important federalism role because it ensures that state high courts protect the liberties of citizens.66 With greater decisionmaking capacity, the Court is more likely to review state actions that run afoul of federal interpretations of federal law.

D. Summary

Because it would enable the Supreme Court to play a more active role as a check on the other branches and as the head of the judicial hierarchy, the Court should have, and should use, more decision-making capacity. We recognize that some might find the idea of expanded Supreme Court decisionmaking troublesome. Some might argue, for example, that the Supreme Court should not play a more active role interpreting or making law because its members are unelected.67 Likewise, others might object to a more active Supreme Court on ideological grounds, if the Supreme Court’s apparent political ideology is significantly more liberal or conservative than theirs.68

This concern, though certainly legitimate, is overblown for several reasons. First, as noted below,69 the Supreme Court reaches unanimous or near-unanimous decisions in roughly half of its cases, even given sharp ideological divisions on the Court. This suggests that ideological concerns, though non-trivial, are consequential in a smaller fraction of the Court’s docket than the public might imagine. Second, even if the Court heard two, three, or even ten times as many cases as it hears today, its output would still pale in comparison to the law propounded by the other two branches (not to mention all of the lower courts). Third, the Court only takes cases and controversies that are brought to it. Even if it were to address many more matters than it does now, it would still only touch on a limited range of legal issues. Fourth, and finally, the Court does not have money or might, so the other branches provide a kind of ultimate check against any potential abuse of power.

65. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006) (granting the Supreme Court the power to review state high court decisions on federal law).

66. From 1953 through 2006, the Supreme Court decided 1388 cases appealed from state and territorial courts and reversed more than 70% of those lower courts’ rulings. See SPAETH DATABASE, supra note __ (providing the raw data from which we draw these figures).

67. See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 16–23 (2d ed. 1986) (coining the phrase “counter-majoritarian difficulty,” which has come to mean the dilemma posed by unelected judges overturning elected policymakers in a democratic regime); see also Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 175–76 (1999) (arguing that the Constitution should be taken away from judges and returned to the people to allow for a “populist constitutional law”); Steven G. Calabresi, The Congressional Roots of Judicial Activism, 20 J.L. & Pol. 577, 588–90 (2004) (advocating for a contraction of Court jurisdiction in order to prevent judicial subrogation of the legislative function); Edwin Meese III & Rhett DeHart, Reining in the Federal Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 178, 182 (1997) (arguing that Congress should regulate and/or restrict Court jurisdiction to curb judicial policymaking).


69. See infra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.
II. Proposal to Expand Court Capacity

To expand the Court’s decisionmaking capacity, as advocated above, Congress could adopt any number of reforms, including altering the Court’s jurisdiction or imposing workload requirements. We recommend, instead, that Congress expand the Court’s capacity by enacting the following measures: First, Congress should expand the size of the Court. Second, Congress should establish panel decisionmaking as the default mode of decisionmaking on the Court. Third, because some cases are arguably so significant as to call for the full Court to speak, Congress should adopt an en banc procedure for selected cases. In short, we argue that Congress should remake the Supreme Court in the U.S. Court of Appeals’ image.

A. Expand the Court

We first recommend that Congress enact a statute authorizing the Court to expand the size of its membership. More justices—particularly if they sit in panels, as we advocate below—means many more decision-making opportunities for the Supreme Court.

To some, it might seem sacrilegious to suggest that Congress should alter the size of the Court’s membership. In fact, however, there is nothing sacrosanct about nine Justices sitting on the Supreme Court. Other high Courts have widely varying memberships. For example, the International Court of Justice has 15 members and the Indian Supreme Court has 26 judges. More tellingly, the U.S. Supreme Court itself, at least historically, saw the size of its membership change with some regularity. The Court’s membership ranged from six Justices in 1789 to ten in 1863. Moreover, for nearly four decades, the Court directed one lone Justice to decide all of the Court’s cases during the summer, effectively creating a part-time, one-Justice Supreme Court. And between 1866 and 1891, various members of Congress called for a dramatic expansion of the Supreme Court from nine to 15, 18, or even 24 Justices to respond to crippling caseloads. Although these proposals were unsuccessful, this suggests that the idea of a dramatically expanded Supreme Court had at least some traction in Congress. And, President

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71. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (six Justices); Judiciary Act of 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420, 421 (seven); Judiciary Act of 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176, 176 (nine); Judiciary Act of 1863, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794, 794 (ten); Judiciary Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209 (seven); Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44 (nine). As part of major reorganization of the federal courts in 1801, Congress decreased the Court’s size to five Justices (four Associate Justices and the Chief Justice). Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89. As the Court had six justices protected by life tenure at the time of the legislation, the smaller Court size would not take effect until the next Court vacancy; however, the Act was repealed in 1802 before a vacancy had occurred. Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 132.

72. See Ross E. Davies, The Other Supreme Court, 31 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 221, 221 (2006).

73. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., at 1484 (Feb. 23, 1869) (Drake’s motion to amend a judiciary bill by increasing the number of associate justice from 8 to 14); Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., at 1869 (Edmunds proposing as an alternative to adding circuit judgeships that the number of justices be doubled); 10 Cong. Rec. 528 (Manning introduced H.R. No. 3844 expanding Court and allowing for divisional sittings); see also Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Constitutional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 186 (2003).
Franklin Roosevelt clearly believed that a larger Court was feasible, even if the context and means of his plan doomed it.\textsuperscript{74}

Despite the variance in the size of the Court’s membership in its earlier years, the Court has been frozen at nine Justices since 1869. But since then, the Court has often decided cases with fewer than nine Justices due to vacancies, illnesses, and recusals.\textsuperscript{75} Since 1954, in fact, the Court has decided nearly one quarter of its merits decisions (1,369 cases) without a full complement of Justices.\textsuperscript{76}

This history shows that there is nothing inevitable about a nine-Justice high Court and that the administration of justice proceeds apace regardless of the number of sitting Justices. This means that the size of the Court – in contrast to the size of the Senate or the House of Representatives\textsuperscript{77} – is truly up for grabs.

1. Size

Given that the size of the Court is up for grabs, what number of Justices should sit on the Court? What adjustments, if any, should Congress make to the size of the Court’s membership?

One possibility is to reduce the number of Justices. Not long ago, the Court routinely heard about twice as many cases as it hears today,\textsuperscript{78} so perhaps Congress should reduce the Court’s membership by a similar amount. If five Justices worked at the same pace as their brethren in the 1970s and 1980s, they could decide, at least in theory, the same number of cases as the current nine-member Court decides. Our goal, however, is not to improve the Court’s work ethic; rather, our goal is to expand the Court’s capacity to decide cases. Shrinking the Court won’t do that.

Another possibility, surely the most likely, is to leave the Court as it is. The Court has had nine members – even if fewer than nine have participated in a large fraction of the Court’s decisionmaking\textsuperscript{79} – for nearly a century and a half. On the basis of an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” rationale, some might lobby for the status quo. If nine Justices were to work as diligently as their predecessors appear to have worked, they could easily hear twice as many cases, thereby enabling the Court to better fulfill its obligation as a coequal branch and the top dog of the

\textsuperscript{74} Following his landslide reelection in 1936, FDR proposed a plan to allow him to appoint six additional Justices—one for each Justice over 70—to the Court. See Caldeira, supra note, at 1141.

\textsuperscript{75} By statute, six Justices constitute a quorum. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also Sup. Ct. R. 4 (2) (“Six Members of the Court constitute a quorum.”).

\textsuperscript{76} These calculations are based on an analysis of decisions in the Spaeth Supreme Court Database. (Focusing only on observations in which ANALU=1 and DEC_TYPE=1, 6, or 7, we computed the number of observations in which the vote totaled less than 9.) See Harold J. Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953–2005 Terms (2008) available at the University of South Carolina Judicial Research Initiative, U.S. Supreme Court Databases, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm.

\textsuperscript{77} Art. I, § 2 (Representatives), § 3 (Senators).

\textsuperscript{78} See __, supra.

\textsuperscript{79} See text accompanying note __, supra.
Although we have seen some signs under Chief Justice Roberts that the Court might resolve more merits cases, we doubt that the Court, as presently constituted, will return to its 1970s and 1980s form. Moreover, we believe the Court should decide even more cases—or at least have greater opportunity to decide more cases—so we reject the status quo.

The third possibility, which is obviously the one we embrace, is to expand the size of the Court. But how many Justices should there be? We do not know how to calculate an “optimal” number of Supreme Court Justices, but we can turn to several external criteria to shed light on this question.

First, we could look at the number of circuits. Until recently, the number of justices was based on this number. As we currently have 13 circuits, we would have a Court of 13. While its original rationale—circuit riding—may no longer be relevant, the effective justification of setting the Court’s size at a level commensurate with the federal workload, as reflected in the number of circuits, is more powerful today than it was in the 1800s.

Second, we could measure the size of the federal judiciary more directly rather than using the number of circuits as a proxy. We could look to the number of cases resolved on the merits or to the number of judges issuing rulings. Both make sense—the justices can be perceived as reviewing cases or monitoring judges. In 1929, Congress added a tenth circuit without adding a tenth justice. And, in that year, the circuits resolved approximately two thousand cases on the merits. During the last term, that number had risen to more than 30,000. If we used caseload as the relevant factor, we’d have to expand the Court by a factor of 15 to 135, an obviously unworkable number. Moreover, it seems unlikely that each case justifies such weight. We can instead look at the expansion of the circuit bench during that time. Forty-five circuit judges were active in 1930, and 179 today. This four-fold increase is more tenable, but it would produce a Supreme Court larger than the largest court of appeals (the Ninth).

Three, the size of the courts of appeals is relevant. Congress has evaluated, through hearings and special commissions, the proper size for an appeals court. Today, the average circuit has 14 active judges (plus several senior judges). Perhaps more tellingly, Congress allows circuits with more than 15 judges to hold “mini” en banc sessions in which 11 judges, rather than all of the circuit’s judges, sit on behalf of the full court.

80. The D.C. Circuit was still the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in 1929. Five years later, Congress reorganized the court as the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the “justices” of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia became circuit judges. Judiciary Act of June 7, 1934, 48 Stat. 926.
82. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 40, at tbl. B-5.
84. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Authorized Judgeships: Appellate at http://www.uscourts.gov/history/appealsauth.pdf (reporting the number of judges per circuit). The mean is 14 and the median is 12.5.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006)). The Ninth Circuit has fully implemented this system. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3
Ultimately, we conclude that Congress should authorize 15 Supreme Court Justices, retaining the odd number that is useful in collective sittings and allowing for five panels of three. Congress, based on the feedback of numerous commissions and other study, concluded that 15 was the tipping point at which mini-en banc should be made an option. We conclude that this is a reasonable number to treat as the maximum workable and still allows for an easy division into panels of three. We know of no scientific basis for 15 – or for 9.86

2. Implementation

If Congress were to expand the Court from nine Justices to 15 Justices, as we advocate above, it would also have to give some thought to how to implement this change. Authorizing the sitting President at the time to expand the Court by two-thirds would create a political uproar, as FDR discovered. Moreover, it would not further our secondary goal of smoothing the timing and political composition of Supreme Court appointments. The statutes would create new seats on a rolling basis: If no justice announces his or her retirement during a congressional term, then a new seat would be added. Every President, then, would be allowed to appoint at least one justice during each Congress—either into a new seat or a vacated one—until there are 14 associate justices and one chief justice. If no justices retire, then a new seat is created and the President fills it. If one or more justices retire, then no seats are created but the President fills the vacated seats. This slower addition of justices also would allow the Court time to adjust its other rules, norms, and practices to its increasing size, new justices to gain expertise and knowledge of the Court’s workings, and the (interested) public to become accustomed to a larger bench. Finally, it makes the proposal more politically feasible.

B. Embrace Panel Decisionmaking

Adding more Justices by itself might or might not enhance Supreme Court decision-making capacity. But when coupled with our second proposed reform—panel decisionmaking—
the potential capacity gains are enormous. If the current, nine-member Supreme Court sat in three-Justice panels rather than en banc, the Court’s output could, at least in theory, triple. If a 15-member Supreme Court sat in three-Justice panels, the Court’s output could, at least in theory, increase by a factor of five. This means that the Court could decide roughly 400 cases per year rather than 75 cases per year without working any harder.

Of course, the Court is not theoretical but practical, and as a practical matter, it is difficult to quantify exactly how large an impact expanded membership plus panel decisionmaking might have. Some factors—for example, the increased opinion-writing demands accompanying a panel system—would decrease the capacity gains associated with a move to panels. Other factors—for example, the efficiencies associated with conferring with two colleagues rather than every other member of the Court—could expand the Court’s output. Regardless, it seems safe to assume that a larger Court sitting entirely (or even primarily) in panels could dramatically increase the quantity of the Court’s decisions.

Panel decisionmaking might seem like a radical idea, but Congress actually considered the possibility of Supreme Court panels as early as 1869, and Representative Van Manning counseled the retention of one court “to promote uniformity of decision and keep each of the judges in touch with all of the decisions of the appellate court.” Id. at 364. The legislature adopted the recommendations. Id. at 363.

91. We propose three-justice panels for two reasons: (1) a three-judge panel constitutes the smallest odd-numbered, multi-judge panel possible, and (2) the federal judiciary has had great success with three-judge panels on courts of appeals of all sizes and for resolution of special issues by three-judge district courts. We do not propose any change in the selection of cases for review, thus all justices would vote on certiorari as they currently do. Presumably, the Court would change its Rule of Four to some larger number. Cf. John Paul Stevens, The Lifespan of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1, 10 (1983) (hypothesizing about the source of the unwritten norm).

92. For a consideration of the relative weight of various case-related responsibilities, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 94–95 (1959) (comparing time spent on opinion writing to time spent on other tasks).

93. For evidence of the collaborative nature of Supreme Court opinion writing, see, e.g., Pamela C. Corley, Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court, 90 JUDICATURE 157 (2007) (finding in the Blackmun Papers evidence of collaboration and negotiation among Justices over the content of opinions, consistent with studies of other Justices’ papers); cf. Deborah J. Barrow & Thomas G. Walker, A Court Divided: The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Politics of Judicial Reform 230–32 (1988) (describing how the growth of the Fifth Circuit complicated the en banc procedure, requiring lengthy discussions that did little to expand on an understanding or examination of the issues presented).

94. We intentionally say “could” rather than “would” for two reasons. First, the Court’s docket is almost entirely plenary, and the Justices therefore would not be required to hear more cases than they currently hear. The dynamics of the certiorari process would influence the decision. Second, the Court may not be overburdened. Some scholars and Justices have argued that the Court is not capacity constrained. See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 174–78 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (claiming that “[w]e are vastly underworked” as reflected in “the vast leisure time we presently have”); William O. Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401 (1960) (arguing that he could decide more cases, and presumably still write books, if the Court granted review to more cases). Of course, far greater numbers have made a contrary assertion. See, e.g., Warren Burger, Year-End Report on the Judiciary 6 (1984); Note, Of High Designs: A Compendium of Proposals to Reduce the Workload of the Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REV. 307, 307 n.5 (1983) (presenting statements from eight of the sitting Justices that the Court was overworked). As we discuss later, panels offer advantages beyond the possibility of resolving larger numbers of cases. That said, we believe expanded capacity is the greatest advantage of our proposal.

95. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 208–13 (1869) (recording discussion of Senator George Henry Williams’s proposal that Congress increase the number of Justices to eighteen and then divide the Court into two nine-Justice divisions). While other Senators expressed support for the idea, at least one supporter doubted that it would be constitutional. Id. at 210 (reflecting Senator Alan Thurman’s statements that “a court divided into sections, if our Constitution permitted it, would be the very best system”). The next record of congressional consideration of
formally offered a bill in Congress in 1880 to address the caseload crisis in the Court at that time. No action was taken on the bill, so Manning offered a new bill in 1881 that would have divided the Court into three-Justice divisions to handle most of its disputes. The Senate Judiciary Committee considered Manning’s idea when it sought to restructure the federal judiciary, but the committee majority ultimately recommended creating intermediate appellate courts rather than authorizing Supreme Court panels. But the minority, including the committee chair, supported the establishment of panels on the Supreme Court for all but the most important cases.

In contrast to Congress, which considered but ultimately rejected panel decisionmaking, other countries did not. Britain, for example, first adopted panel practice for its high court in the Judicature Act of 1875, and the House of Lords and Privy Council continue to sit in divisions. Other common law countries, including Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, and New Zealand, allow their courts of last resort to decide cases in panels. And in the United States, nine state high courts use panels to decide at least some of their cases. In Delaware and Mississippi, for example, three-judge panels act for the full court if the panel is unanimous. If a panelist dissents or the panel proposes to overrule precedent, the high courts in both states rehear the matter en banc.

The fact that panel decisionmaking is common on high courts and that panels almost found a home on the Supreme Court reveals that there is nothing inevitable about en banc decisionmaking on the Court. Nonetheless, we suspect that many Court observers find the

panels appears in 1876 when Senator Knott suggests “divid[ing] the Supreme Court into divisions of three and giv[ing] each division exclusive jurisdiction over a particular class of cases.” 4 CONG. REC. 1126 (1876).


98. See 21 CONG. REC. 10,219–32 (1890). A leading proponent of Manning’s Bill was William M. Evarts, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, who fought for the division of the Supreme Court in front of an American Bar Association committee formed specifically to consider the restructuring proposals then under consideration by Congress. See Frankfurter, supra note 96, at 77. The ABA committee split along the same lines as the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Remedy for the Delays, supra note 97, at 23, 45, The American Law Review, a prominent legal quarterly of the time, came out in support of the panel proposal. The Supreme Court, 9 AM. L. REV. 668, 675 (1874–1875). In 1921, when Congress again was considering ways to alleviate the Court’s workload, the ABA Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform recommended increasing the Court’s size to twelve Justices and allowing it to act with as few as six Justices. Everett P. Wheeler, Report of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, 46 A.B.A. REP. 384, 391 (1921), quoted in Hartnett, supra note 50, at 1668.


100. The states are Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, and Virginia.


prospect of Supreme Court panels troubling. The idea of a panel deciding *Roe v. Wade* \(^{103}\) or *Bush v. Gore* \(^{104}\), as two highly salient examples, might be unsettling to some because of the possibility that the three Justices assigned to those cases might have reached different conclusions than the Court as a whole. If a panel system had been in place in 1973 or 2000, would we live in a world without abortion rights and with *President* Gore? For two reasons, the answer to these questions is “no.”

First, as we explain in greater detail in Part I.C., below, we advocate that the Court retain en banc review for specified cases. Under our proposal, both *Roe v. Wade* and *Bush v. Gore* would qualify (as would similar cases). Thus, truly significant cases – whose properties we identify below – would receive en banc review either initially or following a panel decision, meaning that landmark cases would come out the same way under a panel system as they do under our current en banc system.

Second, and more significantly for the run of the mill case, it turns out that randomly assigned panels are likely to produce Court outcomes that essentially mirror those the Court would reach as a whole. We developed this latter argument in our earlier Essay devoted to panel decisionmaking, so we will dispense with the detailed analysis that leads us to this conclusion. We do want to provide enough detail, however, to support our argument.

As a first approximation, a majority of Justices must agree on the outcome for the Court to issue an opinion, and if a majority agrees, then obviously a majority of panels made up of those Justices would also agree. This fact, in and of itself, suggests that there would be a high degree of consonance between most panels that might be assigned and the en banc Court (assuming, as we do, “sincere” voting).

As a second approximation, we examined every merits case the Court decided from 1953 to 2007. During this period, the Court decided 6,133 cases. \(^{105}\) As Table 1 illustrates, the Court decided many of these cases by a wide margin, either unanimously or with one dissenting Justice. In these cases, *every* potential three-Justice panel that might have been assigned would have reached the same conclusion as the Court as a whole. Because nearly 50% of the cases were decided without dissent or with only one dissenting Justice, \(^{106}\) we know then, based solely on these cases, that a minimum of about half of the Court’s cases would have come out the same way if the Court had used a panel system. (And, it turns out, even 7-2, 6-3, and 5-4 decisions are fairly lopsided, resulting in panels reaching the same outcomes as the en banc Court in roughly 92%, \(^{107}\) 77%, \(^{108}\) and 60% \(^{109}\) of cases.)

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\(^{103}\) 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

\(^{104}\) 531 U.S. 98 (2000)

\(^{105}\) See SPAETH DATABASE, supra note __ (presenting the data from which we calculate these numbers).

\(^{106}\) The Court decided 3,042 cases with none or one dissent, or 49.6% of all decisions. *Id.*

\(^{107}\) If two Justices dissent, then the probability that three-Justice panels will change the outcome is: Pr(d) = \(\frac{C_7,1}{84} = \frac{7}{84}\) or 8.33%. The formula reflects that both dissenting Justices would have to be on a three-Justice panel for it to reach a different outcome than the one chosen by the en banc Court. Those two Justices could serve on a three-Justice panel with any one of the seven Justices in the majority. Hence, there are 7 panels, out of the 84 possible panels, that would produce a different outcome.
These data show that panel decisionmaking is unlikely to lead to outcomes that differ from those decided en banc, but they do not tell us exactly what percentage of cases would come out the same way under a panel system as under the system currently in place. To calculate such a figure, we examined the vote outcome in every case, and we considered every possible panel that could have been assigned (84 in each case, given nine Supreme Court justices\(^{110}\)). We found

\[ \text{Pr(d)} = \frac{(C_3^2) \times (C_6^1) + (C_3^3)}{84} = \frac{19}{84} = 0.2262 \] 

The formula reflects that a three-Justice panel will support a different outcome if it has two dissenting Justices and one majority Justice or all three dissenting Justices. The possible combinations of two dissent and one majority is the number of combinations of two dissenters out of a pool of three \((C_3^2) = 3\) times the number of majority Justices \((C_6^1) = 6\), or 18 possible panels with two dissenters and one majority Justice. In addition, a panel would change the outcome if all three dissenters were on the panel. Thus, there are 19 panels that would reach a different outcome while 65 would reach the same outcome.

108. If four Justices dissent, then the probability that a three-Justice panel (\(k = 3\)) would produce a different outcome is:
\[ \text{Pr(d)} = \frac{((C_4^3) \times (C_5^0) + (C_4^2) \times (C_5^1))}{C_9^3} = \frac{(4 \times 1) + (6 \times 5)}{84} = \frac{34}{84} = 0.4048 \]

109. See note ___ supra.
that 87.4% of Supreme Court cases would have come out the same way if decided by a panel as by the Court as a whole.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>All Cases</th>
<th>Percentage decided the same way</th>
<th>Number remaining the same</th>
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<tr>
<td>8-1</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>492</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-2</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
<td>573</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-3</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>703</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-4</td>
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<td>59.5%</td>
<td>585</td>
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<td>7-1</td>
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<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-2</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-3</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6133</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
<td>5363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This analysis reveals that the Supreme Court would have reached the same result in nearly 90% of its prior cases whether it sat as a full Court or in three-Justice panels.\textsuperscript{111} Assuming Supreme Court behavior during the past half century is predictive of Supreme Court behavior in the future, the analysis also suggests that the Court would reach vastly similar results in future cases whether sitting in panels or as a full Court.\textsuperscript{112} When you take this empirical observation, and when you assume that the Court would retain an en banc procedure for selected cases, the concern that the panels will produce different decisions from the Court as a whole dwindle, if not disappear entirely.

\textbf{C. Retain Limited En Banc Review}

By expanding the size of the Court, and by deciding cases in panels, Congress can dramatically increase the decision-making capacity of the Court. If the Court retained and exercised the discretion to hear some cases en banc – either in the first instance or on review – it

\textsuperscript{111} The foregoing results are not uniformly true across all issue areas because some areas are more likely than others to produce dissent. Still, even in highly divisive areas, such as Criminal Procedure or the First Amendment, three-Justice panels would have produced the same outcome in more than eight out of ten Supreme Court cases.

\textsuperscript{112} The composition of the Court’s docket might have changed under a panel system. To the extent Justices consider the likely outcome if they vote to grant certiorari, the panel system changes a Justice’s estimates. For a discussion of the role of such strategic calculations in the certiorari process, see generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Robert Boucher, \textit{Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court}, 57 J. Pol. 824, 829–36 (1995) (“While most justices appeared to grant certiorari when they disagreed with the lower court, the extent to which the predicted level of support they would receive on the merits mattered was dependent on whether they would affirm if the case were decided on the merits.”).
would obviously reduce some of these capacity gains. Nonetheless, we advocate that Congress grant the Court authority to exercise en banc review because some cases, at least some of the time, may call for the Court to speak as a whole.

If Congress deprived the Court of the ability to act as a collective body, the Court might suffer a loss of institutional legitimacy in the eyes of at least some members of the public.\textsuperscript{113} Given the Court’s lack of enforcement power, its institutional legitimacy is important, at least in those cases involving deeply controversial issues. To give effect to rulings desegregating the public schools,\textsuperscript{114} effectively deciding the winner of a presidential election,\textsuperscript{115} or prohibiting capital punishment in the states,\textsuperscript{116} the Court might need to stand together as a whole, even if the Justices are not fully in agreement with one another.

In thinking about Supreme Court decision-making approaches, four possibilities present themselves. The status quo, at one end of the spectrum, calls for the Court to decide all of its cases en banc. As we have indicated here and elsewhere, we reject this decision-making approach. At the other end of the spectrum, the Court could decide all of its cases in panels. The advantage to this “mandatory panels” approach is that it would enable the Court to capture all of the capacity gains associated with the move from a small en banc Court to a larger Court deciding in panels. The disadvantage to this approach, however, is that the Court would not have the discretion to decide key cases en banc, which \textit{might} harm the Court’s legitimacy (although this does not seem to be a problem in at least some other countries\textsuperscript{117}). For this reason, we reject this approach. Two “mixed” approaches to decisionmaking lie between the en banc-only approach at one end of the spectrum and the panels-only approach at the other end of the spectrum. One of these two approaches, the “discretionary panels” approach, calls for the Court to decide most cases en banc but authorizes the Court to decide specified cases in panels. The other approach, the “discretionary en banc” approach, calls for the Court to decide most cases in panels but authorizes the Court to decide cases en banc in those rare instances where a majority of Justices so orders in response to a party’s suggestion or a Justice’s recommendation. We recommend that Congress adopt this latter approach, which mirrors decisionmaking on the U.S. Courts of Appeals,\textsuperscript{118} because it expands Court capacity substantially while retaining Court discretion to address unusually significant cases as a full body.

If Congress enacted the discretionary en banc approach we advocate, when should the Court exercise its discretion to depart from its default approach of panel decisionmaking to hear a case en banc? The Court should – and in our view, would -- hear only its most significant cases en banc. The statutory authorization should direct the Court to sit en banc to resolve

\textsuperscript{113} Other countries’ high courts act entirely through divisions or panels without an apparent loss in legitimacy. In the United Kingdom, for example, both the Privy Council and the House of Lords hear cases in panels, although panel size may grow in very important cases. United Kingdom, supra note 99, at 1697–700.


\textsuperscript{117} In the United Kingdom, for example, both the Privy Council and the House of Lords hear cases in panels, although panel size may grow in very important cases.

\textsuperscript{118} Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326, 333 (1941) (recognizing the power of circuits to sit en banc).
challenges to the constitutionality of federal statutes, to overturn Court precedent, and to answer other questions of exceptional importance.

Determining what cases are most significant is a matter of some debate, but we believe two types of cases would fall into this category. First, we believe those cases in which the Court exercises judicial review, declaring an act unconstitutional, are among the most significant cases the Court decides.\(^\text{119}\) Since 1953, the Court has declared a statute unconstitutional 461 times, or in nearly 8% of all cases.\(^\text{120}\) Second, it seems likely that the Court would take the position, which is universal in the circuits, that any case in which the Court would overturn precedent is also significant and therefore worthy of en banc consideration.\(^\text{121}\) Since 1953, the Court has overturned precedent in only 134 cases or roughly 2% of the total number of cases. In light of prior decisions, then, we would expect the Supreme Court to sit en banc in approximately 10% of its cases under this discretionary en banc approach.\(^\text{122}\) We expect that the two cases we mentioned earlier—\textit{Bush v. Gore} and \textit{Roe v. Wade}—would have been heard en banc, in one instance because of the obvious political importance (\textit{Bush v. Gore}), and in the other because the constitutionality of a state statute was at issue (\textit{Roe v. Wade}).

Under this approach, the Court should be able to keep an active panel docket while sitting en banc in a handful of important cases. This approach captures most of the efficiency gains of the mandatory panels approach; at the same time, it reduces the likelihood that panels will make decisions that fail to reflect the Court’s overall view. And, it ensures that the Court chooses to act en banc in controversial or divisive cases.

\section*{III. Proposal Pros and Cons}

We have argued that Congress should expand the Supreme Court’s decision-making capacity by remaking the Court in the image of the U.S. Courts of Appeal. By expanding the size of the Court, adopting panel decisionmaking, and retaining limited en banc review, Congress would give the Court the opportunity to dramatically expand its output, perhaps increasing the number of cases it decides each year by a factor of five. As noted above, this increase in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Arthur D. Hellman}, \textit{By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts}, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 693, 699 n.20 (1995) (explaining that all courts of appeals follow a rule that panel rulings bind later panels unless overruled by the en banc circuit or the Supreme Court although a few have an en banc bypass procedure).

  \item This estimate is likely too high. If a panel system had been used in those earlier cases, the Justices on the panel might have been those who disagreed with the Court majority’s decision to overturn precedent. Thus, the panel would not have favored overruling and would not have automatically triggered full Court review. That review would have to wait for a later day when a panel of Justices in favor of such a change controlled the decision.
\end{itemize}
decisionmaking capacity would enable the Court to provide a check against the other branches and lower courts; to generate a more understandable and accurate body of law; and to ensure greater consistency in the laws that govern citizens across the country.

The Court has discretion over its docket, so we recognize that it might choose not to use the additional capacity our proposal would make available. In other words, Congress might expand the number of Justices from nine to fifteen and direct the Court to decide cases in panels, but the Court might choose to continue its practice of hearing fewer than 100 cases per year. We don’t think this is very likely. If the Court made this choice, Congress could require the Court to hear some minimum number of cases. We don’t think this is very likely either. Regardless, the three-pronged proposal we advance in this Essay offers benefits, which we describe below, even if the Court chooses not to use the extra decision-making capacity. Our proposal is not without its flaws, as we also acknowledge below, but its upsides outweigh its downsides.

A. Potential Benefits

1. Credible Threat of Review

The increased decisionmaking capacity afforded by our proposal, even if unused by the Court, would lead to some or all of the benefits of expanded capacity actually used because it would arm the Court with a more credible threat of review. Even assuming the Court continued to review only a small number of federal lower court and state high court rulings and congressional and administrative agency decisions, the cost of invalidation by the Court is sufficiently high that it magnifies any increase in the probability of Court action. Thus, increased capacity, even if unused, should incentivize lower courts and the other branches to toe the line, thereby minimizing shirking by the lower courts and overreaching by the other two branches.

123. The Court is more likely to use the capacity in order to review decisions with which it disagrees. See Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 102–14 (2000) (developing a model of Supreme Court auditing of lower courts based on likely agreement with lower court decisions and finding empirical support for the conclusion that the Court grants certiorari to review decisions with which it disagrees).

124. See Donald Songer, Jeffrey Segal, & Charles Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 681–89 (1994) (finding that courts of appeals are responsive to Supreme Court doctrinal changes but will look for opportunities to further their own preferences); see also Jeffrey R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of Four, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 61, 62–67 (2003) (offering a formal model of Supreme Court auditing of lower courts).

125. See James R. Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 84, 84, 97–98 (2001) (concluding, based on a formal model of court-legislature interaction, that “[t]he possibility of informative judicial review affects the quantity and informational quality of legislation enacted by the Legislature relative to legislation that would be enacted in the absence of judicial review”); see also Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 361, 361, 370, 373–76 (2001) (finding, based on empirical evidence, that the Supreme Court “profoundly constrain[s] House members and senators when casting roll call votes”).
2. Entry and Exit

Our proposal would have salutary effects on both entry onto the Court and exit from the Court. With respect to the appointment and confirmation process, we would expect significantly fewer conflicts between the executive and legislative branches because in most instances, the stakes would be much lower due to the expanded size of the Court’s membership. If each Justice accounted for 6.7% percent of the Court’s total decisionmaking rather than 11% as at present, each Justice would be significantly less important than she is now (unless, of course, the Court is deadlocked on critical issues of concern to the President and Congress).

For the very same reason—that is, because each Justice would be relatively less important or influential on a larger Court that decides most cases in panels—we would expect more Justices to exit the Court in a timely fashion. Rather than calling for term limits or mandatory retirement (both of which likely pose Constitutional problems), the simple expansion of the Court membership might address the widespread concerns that multiple commentators have voiced about Justices who simply stay on the Court too long for strategic (or self-important) reasons.

3. Court Composition

Because the confirmation stakes would be lower, and because turnover would likely be much higher, the President could take more risks in the appointment process. This, in turn, should lead to a more diverse bench. As of this writing, the bench is overwhelmingly white (88.9%), overwhelmingly male (88.9%), and overwhelmingly composed of Justices who sat previously on the U.S. Courts of Appeals (100%). We have no objection to whites (both of us are white), men (one of us is male), or prior Courts of Appeals Justices (alas, neither of us has served in this capacity), but we believe the Court could benefit from more Justices with different demographic characteristics and broader practice backgrounds. To take just one example, we think prior judicial experience is a very valuable attribute for a few of the Justices to possess, but it would also be desirable to have Justices on the Court who have significant experience in private business (e.g., Blackmun), the elected branches (e.g., Warren, Black), and the executive branch (e.g., Taft, Goldberg).

3. Court Cohesion

We would also expect the larger Court to be less divided than the smaller Court. First, most cases would be decided by panels, thereby not involving the majority of the Court, prevention fractious decisions between essentially two halves of the Court.

Second, even in en banc cases, the likelihood of a bare-majority outcome would be much lower, as a matter of simple mathematics, on a Court of this size than on the current court. While the Court will continue to hear close cases, both theoretically and empirically it is the case the minimum-winning coalitions are less likely to occur. This means, of course, that it is much less likely that one or two swing justices (a la O’Connor or Kennedy) would have disproportionate weight on the Court.
4. Judicial Education

Finally, even if the Court opted not to exercise its expanded decisionmaking capacity to hear more appeals on its docket, it might use the additional capacity to acquaint itself with the lower courts and trial procedure. The Court could do this in three ways.

First, the Court could play a more active role in its original jurisdiction docket. Under the constitution, the Court is required to hear “cases” and “controversies”. When these cases make their way to the Court, the Court appoints a special master to conduct the necessary trial work. Instead of proceeding in this fashion in all cases, the Court could play this role, by assigning its original jurisdiction cases to a panel or to an individual Justice.

Second, Justices used to sit by designation in some district court cases. In so doing, the Justices could observe firsthand how lower courts interpret and implement higher Court rulings. By renewing this practice, the Justices could again become better acquainted with the Courts they monitor.

Third, Justices used to “ride circuit” to become familiar with the U.S. Courts of Appeals. This practice has largely died, but by expanding the Courts’ decision-making capacity in the manner we propose in this Essay, each individual Justice should have much more opportunity to ride circuit.

By playing a more active role in the Court’s original jurisdiction docket, by sitting in district court cases by designation, and by riding circuit, each Justice would learn more about the lower courts they monitor and trial court procedures they affect. This knowledge, in turn, should enable the Court to make better decisions as it goes about its business. Thus, our three-pronged proposal might ultimately enhance the quality of the Court’s decisions.

B. Potential Costs

1. Legitimacy

Our proposal raises two potential legitimacy concerns. First, some might question the Court’s legitimacy because of its expansion in size; if some find it troubling that the Court includes nine unelected members, they will find it even more disconcerting if the Court were to include 15 unelected members, as advocated under our proposal.

This legitimacy concern does not trouble us for a couple of reasons. The United States Court of Appeals have large, unelected memberships, and as far as we can tell, those courts and their decisions have ample legitimacy in the eyes of most member of society. And, as noted above, the expansion of the Supreme Court will erode the power of each individual Justice. Thus, although an expansion will increase the number of unelected officials serving on the high Court, each of them will enjoy less influence than is true at present.

The second legitimacy concern is more troubling. Some might question the Court’s legitimacy not because of its expansion in size but because it would, under our proposal, decide most cases in panels. As far as we can tell, however, panel decisionmaking has not undermined
the legitimacy of high courts in other countries; high courts in the several states that authorize panel decisionmaking; or the U.S. Courts of Appeals, which decide most questions of federal law.

2. Decision Quality

Under our proposal, three Justices, rather than the Court as a whole, would decide most cases, but the Court as a whole – a group much larger than the current Court – would decide a fraction of cases en banc. Some might worry about the impact of group size on the Court’s decisions. Would panels produce inferior decisions because they are made up of three judges rather than nine? Would the en banc Court make inferior decisions because it is made up of 15 rather than nine? The research on group decisionmaking is mixed, equivocal, and not directly relevant to appellate court decisionmaking. Nonetheless, it suggests that a larger Court might possess some decisionmaking advantages over a smaller Court and vice-versa.

The research indicates that larger groups generally possess what we might think of as a “resource” advantage.\(^{126}\) They often have greater ability, expertise, energy, and diversity than smaller groups.\(^{127}\) They tend to deliberate longer than smaller groups,\(^{128}\) and they tend to outperform smaller groups on such tasks as “information-gathering and fact-finding” because such tasks “can be broken down into different components and specific subtasks [can be] allocated to different members of the group.”\(^ {129}\)

Smaller groups, on the other hand, tend to have “process” advantages.\(^{130}\) Because they tend to be less complicated than larger groups,\(^{131}\) smaller groups tend to possess communication

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126. See, e.g., Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior 173–14 (3d ed. 1981) (identifying the resource advantages of large groups and the process advantages of small groups and concluding that “whether the [group] performance will become more or less effective as size increases will depend upon the degree to which added resources can be utilized and the degree to which group processes exert negative influence on group output”); Glenn E. Littlepage, Effects of Group Size and Task Characteristics on Group Performance: A Test of Steiner’s Model, 17 Pers. & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 449, 449 (1991) (“The relationship between group size and group performance shows substantial variability across studies.”).

127. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 126, at 173 (observing that “the added resources that are available in larger groups (abilities, knowledge, range of opinions, etc.) contribute to effective group performance” and that larger groups “tend to be more diverse”); John M. Levine & Richard L. Moreland, Small Groups, in 2 The Handbook of Social Psychology 415, 422 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998) (“As a group grows larger, it has access to more resources (e.g., the time, energy, and exercise of its members), so its performance ought to improve.”); Richard L. Moreland et al., Creating the Ideal Group: Composition Effects at Work, in Understanding Small Group Behavior: Small Group Processes and Interpersonal Relations 11, 13 (E.H. Witte & J.H. Davis eds., 1996) (observing that larger groups “often perform better because they have access to more resources, including time, energy, money, and expertise”).


130. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 126, at 173–74 (identifying the resource advantages of large groups and the process advantages of small groups and concluding that “whether the [group] performance will become more or less effective as size increases will depend upon the degree to which added resources can be utilized and the degree to which group processes exert negative influence on group output”); Glenn E. Littlepage, Effects of Group Size and Task Characteristics on Group Performance: A Test of Steiner’s Model, 17 Pers. & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 449, 449 (1991) (“The relationship between group size and group performance shows substantial variability across studies.”).

and coordination advantages, to be more cooperative, to be more cohesive, to avoid such problems as “social loafing” and free-riding among some group members, and to reach outcomes more expeditiously. Smaller groups, in short, tend to be more “effective at using information to come to a decision.”

Collectively, the research suggests that our proposal might position the Court to take advantage of both smaller and larger group dynamics. Smaller groups appear to possess decision-making process advantages. Under our proposal, most Court business would be conducted in panels, allowing the Court to take advantage of this decision-making edge. Large groups appear to possess resource advantages, which might provide for a richer, if more complicated, decision environment. Under our proposal, the Court would retain discretion to decide important cases en banc, allowing the full resources of the Court as a whole to be brought to bear on these particularly significant issues.

3. Induced Cert

Another potential concern is that our panel proposal might induce losing litigants to appeal. If the Court’s decisionmaking capacity expands by a factor of five, a losing litigant might estimate that the prospect that the Court will grant her cert petition will also rise by a factor of five. In other words, her probability of obtaining review by the Court rises. Because many losing litigants will perceive this in the same way, this could lead to a significant increase

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132. See, e.g., Levine & Moreland, supra note 127, at 422 (observing that “in larger groups, coordination losses are also more likely”); Moreland et al., supra note 127, at 13 (observing that larger groups “often experience coordination problems that can interfere with their performance”).

133. See, e.g., Axel Franzen, Group Size Effects in Social Dilemmas: A Review of the Experimental Literature and Some New Results for One-Shot N-PD Games, in SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND COOPERATION 117, 117, 132 (Ulrich Schulz et al. eds., 1994) (observing that it is “common knowledge in the social sciences that large groups show less cooperative behavior than small groups,” but finding, based on prisoner’s dilemma experiments, that this is true in repeat play games only); Moreland et al., supra note 127, at 14 (“There is more conflict among the members of larger groups, who are less likely to cooperate with one another.” (citations omitted)).

134. See, e.g., PENNINGTON, supra note 129, at 79 (“Larger groups, of say seven or more, do have a tendency to break down into smaller subgroups.”).

135. See, e.g. id. at 56–68 (observing that social loafing is more likely to be a problem as group size increases); Steven J. Karau & Kipling D. Williams, Social Loafing: A Meta-Analytic Review and Theoretical Integration, 65 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681, 700–02 (1993) (finding, using meta-analytic techniques, a positive correlation between group size and social loafing and noting various factors that can dampen it); Levine & Moreland, supra note 127, at 422 (noting that “motivation losses due to social loafing, free riding, and efforts to avoid exploitation” are more likely in larger groups).

136. See, e.g., PENNINGTON, supra note 129, at 79 (“Research shows that smaller groups, of between three and eight, are faster at completing tasks than are larger groups of 12 or more members.”).

137. See id.

138. To be sure, we do not want to overstate the import of this research for the question we are exploring here. As noted above, none of this research is based on Supreme Court Justices or judges generally, nor does any of it ask experimental subjects to perform the tasks that appellate judges perform—i.e., review a record, digest legal briefs, preside over oral arguments, analyze and synthesize the information, reach a decision, and produce an opinion. Moreover, this research compares groups of varying sizes, often very small groups to quite large groups; only occasionally do researchers compare three-person groups to nine-person groups.
in cert petitions. In the same way that building more roads can induce more traffic, creating more opportunities for Supreme Court review might induce more cert petitions.\footnote{For an analysis of induced litigation more generally, see Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, \textit{Induced Litigation}, 98 NW U L. REV. 545 (2004).}

We think this is plausible, and we suspect, as a consequence, that this might require the Court (and/or its clerks) to spend relatively more time reviewing cert petitions. If Congress removed discretion from the Court and made its docket mandatory, the increase in cert petitions would swamp any increased capacity made available by the expansion of the Court and panel decisionmaking. But because we propose that Congress allow the Court retain discretion over its docket, the increase in cert petitions should have only a minimal impact on the Court’s overall workload.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

In this Essay, we elaborate on our earlier work on Supreme Court decisionmaking by making three specific proposals. First, we argue that Congress should expand the Court so that it includes 15 Justices. Second, we recommend that Congress adopt panel decisionmaking as the norm on the Supreme Court. Third, we recommend that Congress grant the Court discretionary en banc review according to which the Court can hear selected, significant cases en banc. Taken together, this three-pronged approach, if embraced by Congress, would enable the Court to hear many more cases and thereby better fulfill its varied roles. Moreover, as identified above, the proposal offers a number of benefits separate and apart from those associated with increased decision-making capacity, and collectively, these advantages outweigh the modest disadvantages associated with the proposal. Thus, we end where we began: Congress should remake the Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals image.