Deregulation using Stealth Science Strategies
In this Article, we explore the “stealth” use of science by the
Executive Branch to advance deregulation and highlight the limited,
existing legal and institutional constraints in place to discipline and
discourage these practices. Political appointees have employed dozens
of strategies over the years, in both Democratic and Republican
administrations, to manipulate science in ends-oriented ways that
advance the goal of deregulation. Despite this bald manipulation of
science, however, the officials frequently present these strategies as
necessary to bring “sound science” to bear on regulatory decisions. To
begin to address this problem, it is important to reconceptualize how
the administrative state addresses science-intensive decisions. Rather
than allow agencies and the White House to operate as a cohesive unit,
institutional bounds should be drawn around the scientific expertise
lodged within the agencies. We propose that the background scientific
work prepared by agency staff should be firewalled from the evaluative,
policymaking input of the remaining officials, including politically
appointed officials, in the agency.
Full Citation
Thomas O McGarity and Wendy Wagner, Deregulation using Stealth Science Strategies, 68 Duke Law Journal 1719 (2019).