Property and the Sources of Inequality

In this essay, I advance three general claims concerning the rich and intriguing new book by Christopher Essert, Property Law in the Society of Equals. The first claim addresses the nature of the connection between relational equality and independence.  I argue that, at times, relational equality requires some degree of subordination.  The second concerns the nature of the things subject to ownership in law, specifically what distinguishes public or private property.  I criticize the Book’s reliance on the concept of the “nature of things.” And the third concerns the sources of relational inequality, arguing that the Book defends an overly narrow conception of relational equality, one that reduces relational inequality to a single wrongdoing: subordination. The reduction, I argue, weakens the liberal case for private property as it leaves out other, equally troubling forms of relational inequality, such as exploitation, discrimination, non-accommodation, and carelessness, among others.