Case:
Civ. 1e Bull. Civ., 2000 I n¿ 167 p. 107 JCP 2001. II. 10524 Case X v. Société Hachette Filipacchi associés Subsequent Developments
Date:
30 May 2000
Note:
Translated French Cases and Materials under the direction of Professor B. Markesinis and M. le Conseiller Dominique Hascher
Translated by:
Tony Weir
Copyright:
Professor B. S. Markesinis

On the first ground of application for review, first limb:

In view of article 9(1) Code civil;

Given that M. X.’s claim based on the fact that photographs of himself which he had had taken for publicity purposes were used by Paris Magazine to illustrate an article criticising his career and life-style was dismissed by the judgment under attack on the ground that even if these photographs of M. X. were used to illustrate an article which was critical of the way he had had his image put on all kinds of products, they were still, as a graphic illustration of his commercial activities, serving the purposes of publicity which he himself had authorised;

But given that in so deciding when it is clear that this publication of the photographs was not in line with the purpose for which the claimant gave his authorisation, the Court of Appeal violated the article cited above;

In view of article 9(1) Code civil:

Given that the claim of M. X. that the publication of details of his wealth and income violated the respect due to his private life was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the ground that a person’s wealth does not form part of the narrow sphere of his private life, and that the claimant himself had published this information in an autobiography;

But given that in so holding when the article in issue related not only to the wealth of M. X. but also to his life-sty le and character in a manner not justified by the claimant’s prior disclosures, the Court of Appeal violated the text cited above;

For these reasons, which render it unnecessary to decide on the other limbs of the application for review;

QUASHES and annuls the whole of the decision rendered on 6 March 1998 by the Court of Appeal of Paris, and remands the case as it was prior to that decision to the Court of Appeal of Versailles for justice to be done between the parties.

Civ 1, 30 May 2000: In the use of photographs of an artist, the purpose intended in the authorisation given by the person concerned should be respected. The fact that he has published this information concerning himself does not justify its publication without his consent. Any disclosure of information relating to the private life of a person is subject to his express and special authorisation, as is its further disclosure, even though the facts related have been disclosed with the agreement of the person concerned himself or by that person directly. It is also made clear by this judgment that publication should respect the purpose intended in the authorisation given by the person concerned. As is observed by Hélène Pélissier-Gateau and Caroline Guillemain (Jurisclasseur numérique, responsibilité civile et assurances, instalment 133-30 (November 2002 nos 17 to 22), "the right which is protected in this particular kind of case is not the right to respect for private life, infringed simply by the revelation without consent of a fact of an intimate nature, but moreover the exclusive right of a person to exploit revelations relating to his private life ie a right to his private life. The right to respect for private life undoubtedly assumes, on this hypothesis, the character of property, and approaches the right to one's image". But certain lower courts - encouraged by a school of legal writers - object to this analysis, an objection which the Cour de cassation itself seems to have implicitly adopted (Civ 2, 3 April 2002 recognising that certain events of a private nature which had already been recounted by the press had the character of a "public fact"). For the authors mentioned above, although the court did not specify whether the revelation of such facts had been initially authorised or not, it seems unlikely that such an authorisation had not been given, because the mention of these facts would then unquestionably come under violation of private life. This is why this judgment, according to them, "constitutes a first step towards the abandonment of the systematic sanction of unauthorised further disclosure of facts officially revealed by the person concerned".

Translation by Raymond Youngs

 

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