Case:
Cour de cassation, Assemblée plénière. D. 1991, 324 Case Association des centres éducatifs v. Blieck
Date:
29 March 1991
Note:
Translated French Cases and Materials under the direction of Professor B. Markesinis and M. le Conseiller Dominique Hascher
Translated by:
Tony Weir
Copyright:
Professor B. S. Markesinis

Cour de cassation

The Court: Given that according to the judgment below (Limoges, 23 March 1989) upholding the decision at first instance, Joël Weevauters, a mental defective lodged in the Centre d’aide par le travail de Sornac, set fire to a forest belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Blieck, who then claimed damages from the Association des centres éducatifs du Limousin, which managed the Sornac centre, and its insurers;

Given that the defendants criticise the judgment for holding them liable under article 1384(1) Code civil when it is only in the cases specified by law that one person is liable for the conduct of another and that the Court of Appeal did not state on what basis the defendants were responsible for those in their charge;

But given that as it follows from the statements in the judgment to the effect that the defendant’s centre was designed to accommodate in a protected environment the mentally handicapped persons sent there and that during the daytime Joël Weevauters was allowed total freedom of movement, that the association had taken longterm control of the way this handicapped person was to live, the Court of Appeal was entitled to hold that it must answer for him under article 1384(1) and must pay for the damage he did;

From which it follows that the criticism is baseless;

This note on subsequent developments reflects the legal situation as of October 2004.

Assemblee pleniere, 29 March 1991: This judgment marks an important reversal in regard to liability in respect of another person. From now on, the cases of liability on account of another person are no longer understood in a restrictive manner. Any person having long term power of organisation, direction and control over other persons must answer for harm caused by them. The absence of fault committed by the person who has these powers (who may be a physical or legal person) does not matter. Only the act of a third party, the victim's fault or force majeure can exonerate him from this liability. It is therefore definitely a question of liability as of right, comparable in this sense to that of a custodian of a thing, as is affirmed by a judgment by the criminal chamber of the Cour de cassation (26 March 1997, Bull crim no 124) regarding acts of delinquency committed by minors, who had been entrusted to the custody of an institution. Other decisions have subsequently applied this principle to sports associations (Civ 2, 3 February 2000, Bull no 26 and, earlier, 22 May 1995, Bull no 155), or to a commune accommodating down-and-outs (Civ 2, 22 May 1995, Bull no 149). It will be noted nevertheless that certain decisions made by the Cour de cassation have, it seems, attempted to mitigate the strictness of this solution when it would be capable of being applied to persons in the voluntary sector who are often not insured for this type of risk (Civ 2, 25 February 1998, Bull no 62, 25 January 1995, Bull no 29, 18 September 1996, Bull no 217 - a contrario, cf  Crim 28 March 2000, Bull crim no 140).

Translation by Raymond Youngs

 

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